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Summary
Cryptographic keys and their management in network communication is considered
the main building block of security over which other security primitives are based.
These cryptographic keys ensure the privacy, authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation of messages. However, the use of these cryptographic keys and their
management in dealing with the resource constrained devices (i.e. Sensor nodes) is
a challenging task.
A number of key management schemes have been introduced by researchers all
over the world for such resource constrained networks. For example, light weight
PKI and elliptic curve cryptography schemes are computationally expensive for these
resource constrained devices. So far the symmetric key approach is considered best
for these constrained networks and different variants of it been developed for these
networks (i.e. probabilistic key distribution approach). The probabilistic key distri-
bution approach consumes less memory than the standard symmetric key approach
but it suffers from the connectivity issues (i.e. the connectivity depends on the
common shared keys between the nodes).
Most of those schemes were proposed by considering static sensor networks (e.g.
Industrial process monitoring, Environmental monitoring, movement detection in
military applications, forests etc.). However, the use of these existing key manage-
ment schemes for mobile wireless sensor networks applications introduces more chal-
lenges in terms of network connectivity, energy consumption, memory cost, commu-
nication overhead and protection of key materials against some well known attacks.
Keeping these challenges in mind, previous research has proposed some key man-
agement schemes considering the mobility scenarios in ad hoc networks and wireless
sensor networks (e.g. vehicular networks, health monitoring systems).However these
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schemes consume more resource because of a much higher communication packet ex-
change during the handover phase for the authentication of joining and leaving nodes
than the static networks where there is no extra communication for the handover
and authentication.
The motivation of this research work is to investigate and propose new algo-
rithms not only to improve the efficiency of these existing authentication and key
management schemes in terms of connectivity, memory and security by considering
the mobility scenario in wireless sensor networks, but also to develop new algorithms
that suit these constrained networks than the existing schemes.
First, we choose the existing key pool approach for authentication and key
management and improve its network connectivity and resilience against some well
known attacks (e.g. node capturing attacks) while reduce the memory cost by stor-
ing those key pools in each sensor node. In the proposed solution, we have divided
the main key pool into two virtual mutually exclusive key pools. This division and
constructing a key from two chosen keys, one from each key pool, helps to reduce
the memory cost of each node by assigning fewer keys for the same level of network
connectivity as the existing key pool frameworks.
Although, the proposed key pool approach increases the network resilience against
node compromission attacks because of the smaller number of keys assigned to each
node, however it does not completely nullify the effect of the attacks. Hence we
proposed an online mutual authentication and key establishment and management
scheme for sensor networks that provides almost 100% network connectivity and
also nullifies the effect of node compromission attacks. In the proposed online key
generation approach, the secret key is dependent on both communicating parties.
Once the two communicating parties authenticate each other, they would success-
fully establish a secret communication key, otherwise they stop communication and
inform the network manager about the intruder detection and activity.
The last part of the thesis considers the integration of two different technologies
(i.e. wireless sensor networks and IP networks). This is a very interesting and
demanding research area because of its numerous applications, such as smart energy,
smart city etc.. However the security requirements of these two kind of networks
(resource constrained and resourceful) make key management a challenging task.
Hence we use an online key generation approach using elliptic curve cryptography
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which gives the same security level as the standard PKI approach used in IP networks
with smaller key length and is suited for the sensor network packet size limitations.
It also uses a less computationally expensive approach than PKI and hence makes
ECC suitable to be adopted in wireless sensor networks. In the key management
scheme for IP based sensor networks, we generate the public private key pair based on
ECC for each individual sensor node. However the public key is not only dependent
on the node’s parameter but also the parameters of the network to which it belongs.
This increases the security of the proposed solution and avoids intruders pretending
to be authentic members of the network(s) by spreading their own public keys.
In the last part of the thesis we consider Content Centric Networking (CCN)
which is a new routing architecture for the internet of the future. Building on
the observation that today’s communications are more oriented towards content
retrieval (web, P2P, etc.) than point-to-point communications (VoIP, IM, etc.), CCN
proposes a radical revision of the Internet architecture switching from named hosts
(TCP/IP protocols) to named data to best match its current usage. In a nutshell,
content is addressable, routable, self-sufficient and authenticated, while locations
no longer matter. Data is seen and identified directly by a routable name instead
of a location (the address of the server). Consequently, data is directly requested
at the network level not from its holder, hence there is no need for the DNS). To
improve content diffusion, CCN relies on data distribution and duplication, because
storage is cheaper than bandwidth: every content - particularly popular one - can
be replicated and stored on any CCN node, even untrustworthy. People looking
for particular content can securely retrieve it in a P2P-way from the best locations
available.
So far, there has been little investigation of the security of CCNs and there is
no specific key management scheme for that. We propose an authentication and
key establishment scheme for CCNs in which the contents are authenticated by
the content generating node, using pre-distributed shares of encryption keys. The
content requesting node can get those shares from any node in the network, even from
malicious and intruder ones, in accordance with a key concept of CCNs. In our work
we also provide means to protect the distributed shares from modification by these
malicious/intruder nodes. The proposed scheme is again an online key generation
approach but including a relation between the content and its encryption key. This
v
dependency prevents the attackers from modifying the packet or the key shares.
Since the integration of sensor networks with IP networks is not only a very
attractive research area but also the CCN architecture may be adopted for the in-
ternet of the future, the investigation of a single suitable key management scheme for
sensor networks within the CCN architecture will be an interesting future research
topic.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
Recent advances in Micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) and wireless com-
munication technologies made it possible to build small devices that can run au-
tonomously and be deployed in a large-scale, low power, inexpensive manner that is
acceptable to many commercial and government users. These devices can be used
to form a new class of distributed networking, namely Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs). Sensor networks configurations range from very flat, with few command
nodes denoted as base stations, sinks or cluster controllers, to hierarchical nets con-
sisting of multiple networks layered according to operational or technical require-
ments. The existence of sensor hardware and the robustness and reliability of such
sensor networks tries to build a bridge between the abstract world and the physical
world. These sensors are devices that can measure a physical quantity (e.g. temper-
ature, humidity) and convert it into a digital signal. Using these sensors, computer
systems ranging from the simplest washing machine to the Large Hadron Collider
(a particle accelerator located at the European Organization for Nuclear Research
(CERN)) can acquire and process information coming from the physical world. This
ability to ”feel” the world is usually embedded in the design of a computer system,
e.g. sensors in a washing machine are integrated within the system from the initial
design. However, it would be particularly interesting to make this ability available
as an off-the-shelf component. As a result, any computer system, regardless of its
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design, could be able to perceive the physical world. Such is the task of Wireless
Sensor Networks.
The structure of a wireless sensor network can be seen in Figure 1.1. A wire-
less sensor network is composed by two types of devices: sensor nodes, and base
stations. The sensor nodes, also known as motes or simply nodes, are small and
constrained devices that have the ability to ”feel”, ”think”, ”talk”, and ”subsist”.
They can ”feel”, because they can sense the physical features of their surrounding
(e.g. temperature, humidity, radiation, vibration) using hardware sensors. They can
”think”, because although they are highly constrained in both computational power
and memory, they are capable of processing information on their own. They can
”talk”, because they are equipped with wireless transceivers, and can collaborate
towards a common goal. Finally, they can ”subsist” because they are in most cases
powered by batteries, and can survive in their deployment field for more than a year
if their internal operations are optimized.
Figure 1.1. Structure of Wireless Sensor Networks
Regarding the base station, it is a more powerful device that usually behaves as
an interface between the services provided by the sensor nodes (the ”data acquisi-
tion network”) and the users of the network (the ”data dissemination network”).
Normally, the base station collects all the information coming from the sensor nodes
3
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and stores it for later use.Also, it can issue control orders to the sensor nodes in
order to change their behavior. While it would seem that wireless sensor networks
are highly dependent of the existence of this base station, the architecture of the
network is not centralized. Sensor nodes can operate in a decentralized fashion,
managing themselves without accessing to the base station.
Since the early 1990s, distributed sensor networking has been an area of ac-
tive research. The trend is to move from a centralized, super reliable single-node
platform to a dense and distributed multitude of cheap, lightweight and potentially
individually unreliable components that, as a group, are capable of far more complex
tasks than any single super node. The intuition is to have individual sensor nodes
share information with each other and collaborate to improve detection probabili-
ties while reducing the likelihood of false alarms. Research prototype sensors (UCB
motes, Tmote Sky, Telos, EyesIFX, ScatterWeb MSB-430) are designed and manu-
factured, energy efficient MAC, topology control protocols and routing schemes are
implemented and evaluated, various enabling technologies such as time synchroniza-
tion), localization and tracking are being studied and invented. All these provide
sensor networks tremendous potential for information collection and processing in a
variety of application domains.
The first generation of sensor nodes facilitated the genesis of wireless sensor
networks as they exist today: small resource-constrained embedded devices that
communicate via low-power, low-bandwidth radio, capable of performing simple
sensing tasks. A first set of scenarios for these networks included stationary nodes
sensing ephemeral features of the environment, like temperature, noise, air pollu-
tion, etc. By continuously monitoring these surrounding attributes, they solved
relatively small-scale specialized problems such as forest monitoring, preventative
maintenance, etc.
Early sensor networks, as shown in Figure 1.2, functioned primarily into two
important application domains: monitoring and tracking. WSNs can be configured
to monitor a variety of target types. The networks themselves are mode-agnostic,
enabling multiple types of sensors to be employed, depending on operational require-
ments; cameras as vision sensors, microphones as audio sensors, ultrasonic, infrared,
light, temperature, pressure/force, vibration, radio activity, seismic sensors, and so
on. Target tracking can also be performed effectively with sensors deployed as a
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Figure 1.2. History of research in sensor networks application domain
three-dimensional field and covering a large geographic area. Therefore, some of the
most common applications are military, medical, environmental and habitat mon-
itoring, industrial and infrastructure protection, disaster detection and recovery,
green growth and agriculture, intelligent buildings, law enforcement, transportation
and space discovery. For instance, in enterprise scale manufacturing and retail com-
panies, sensor networks can be combined with RFID (Radio Frequency ID) tags
to monitor inventory and support in-process parts tracking. These networks can
automatically report problems at various stages such as in-plant manufacturing,
packaging, and equipment maintenance.
the latest trend in sensor networking tries to change the traditional view of
sensor-based environments where people are passive data consumers that simply
interact with physically embedded static sensor webs, with one where people carry
5
1 – Introduction
mobile sensing elements involving the collection, storage, processing and fusion of
large volumes of data related to everyday human activities. This evolution is driven
by the miniaturization and introduction of sensors into popular electronic devices like
mobile phones and PDAs. With wireless sensor platforms in the hands of thousands,
we can expect sensor networks to address urban-scale problems as shown in Figure
1.2. Such systems referred to as urban sensing or people-centric sensing. These
systems aim at daily life applications, employing the mobile devices people already
carry for sensing information directly or indirectly related to human activity, as well
as aspects of the environment around them.
Unlike other more capable devices such as PDAs, there is no human user di-
rectly controlling the sensor node: motes are usually accessed through other motes
or through the base station. In fact, sensor nodes can set up their services and
function properly in situations where there is no central control available. Due to
this autonomy, sensor nodes need to self-configure and maintain themselves during
the lifetime of the network. Precisely, a wireless sensor network can function for
long periods of time, ranging from several days to one or two years. Regarding the
network deployment, sensor nodes are usually deployed near the physical source of
the events, and the exact deployment location of these sensor nodes is usually not
known in advance. Finally, sensor nodes are usually not mobile, although there
might be scenarios where some sensor nodes or even the base station need to move
(e.g. tracking a target as explained above).
1.2 Security Aspects of Wireless Sensor Networks
In any environment, either physical or logical, there exists the need of maintaining
someone or something safe, away from harm. This is the role of security. On
any computer-related environment, security can be considered as a nonfunctional
requirement that maintains the overall system usable and reliable, protecting the
information and information systems. In fact, in wireless sensor networks, security
is of paramount importance: the network must be adequately protected against
malicious threats that can affect its functionality. Due to the role of sensor networks
as a ”sensory system”, any disturbance in a sensor network may have consequences in
the real world. However, sensor networks are especially vulnerable against external
6
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and internal attacks due to their peculiar characteristics.
 The devices of the network (i.e. sensor nodes) are constrained in terms of
computational capabilities, memory, communication bandwidth, and battery
power. As a result, it is challenging to implement and use the cryptographic
algorithms and protocols required for the creation of security services.
 In most cases, it is easy to physically access sensor nodes: they must be located
near the physical source of the events. Since nodes are not tamper-resistant
due to cost constraints, any human user or machine can reprogram them or
simply destroy them.
 Any internal or external device can access the information exchange because
the communication channel is public. Besides, attacking the availability of the
wireless channel is not a complex task.
 It is a difficult task to monitor and control the actual state of the elements of
the network due to the inherent distributed nature of sensor networks. Any
failure in any of its elements may remain unnoticed, or the actual cause of the
malfunction may not be known. Besides, a sensor network can be attacked at
any point.
1.3 Security Threats in Wireless Sensor Networks
Due to their previously shown inherent vulnerabilities, sensor networks have to face
multiple passive and active attacks that may easily hinder its functionality and
nullify the benefits of using its services. Passive attacks are able to retrieve data
from the network, but do not influence over its behaviour. On the other hand,
active attacks directly hinder the provisioning of services. The different threats that
target sensor networks will be detailed in the following paragraphs, and they can be
categorized as follows:
 Common Attacks. As the wireless medium is used as the main transmission
channel in WSN, it is easily subject to various types of attacks, either passive
(eavesdropping) or active (data injection).
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Figure 1.3. Security Threats of Wireless Sensor Networks
 Denial of Service Attacks (DoS). These attacks prevent any part of WSN
from functioning correctly or in a timely manner. Such attacks can target
the communication channel (e.g. jamming) or the life of the nodes themselves
(e.g. power exhaustion).
 Node Compromise. An embedded device is considered being compromised
when an attacker, through various means, gains control or access to the node
itself after it is being deployed. These attacks are usually utilized as a foun-
dation for more powerful, damaging attacks.
 Side-channel Attacks. An adversary can monitor certain physical properties
of the nodes, such as electromagnetic emission, whenever it performs a crypto-
graphic operation. If the recorded physical values are influenced by the secret
key, then the adversary can extract information about that key.
 Impersonation Attacks. A malicious sensor node can create multiple fake
identities (sybil attack), and also can create duplicates with the same identity
(replication attack). These types of attacks are also the initial step which
enables the attacker to conduct a wide range of malicious attacks.
 Protocol-specific Attacks. Some essential protocols used in WSN, such as
routing, aggregation, and time synchronization, are targeted by specific attacks
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that aim to influence the internal services of the network.
1.3.1 Common Attacks
By using the so-called common attacks class, a malicious adversary uses a device
that does not belong to the sensor network in order to access the contents of the
communication channel. The simplest instance of common attack is eavesdropping.
It can be defined as the interception of information or data by an unintended party.
Due to the broadcast nature of the communication channel, any adversary (using a
mote or a more powerful device such as a PDA) can sniff out packets at a particular
frequency, obtaining confidential information about the state of the network and
the physical parameters sensed by the nodes. As the eavesdropping attack has an
inherent passive nature, it does not directly influence over the behaviour of the
network.
However, the acquired information from passive attacks can be used to perform
active attacks. The effects of active attacks are far more destructive: adversaries
can create fake events or hide problematic situations, and can even introduce bogus
control information. One of these active attacks is message modification, where an
adversary intercepts and modifies the packets content meant for the base station
or intermediate nodes. Another active attack is message replay. In this attack,
the adversary reuses valid transaction messages or packets content with malicious
intent. The adversary performs a replay attack by first intercepting a valid critical
transaction data packet and then re-transmitting at a later time. Lastly, attackers
can use message injection to fabricate and send out false data into the network,
maybe masquerading as one of the nodes.
1.3.2 Denial of Service Attacks
One special class of active attack, known as Denial of Service (DoS), deserves a cat-
egory of its own. In this kind of attack, the objective of the malicious adversary is
simple: to avoid the provisioning of services. As these services are published by the
sensor nodes through a wireless channel, the most basic DoS attacks can target the
nodes themselves (power exhaustion attack) or the communication channel (jam-
ming attack). In the power exhaustion attack, an attacker imposes a particularly
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complex task to a sensor node in order to deplete its battery life. Sensor nodes
usually have a limited supply of energy, thus this attack is particularly dangerous.
Besides, as sensor nodes have limited computational power, this attack can also slow
down their reaction time. An example of an expensive operation is the verification
of a cryptographic signature using public key cryptography. An attacker can take
advantage of the complexity of this operation by repeatedly sending fake signatures
to force the receiver to check their correctness. Power exhaustion attacks are not
limited to only CPU attacks: an attacker can target the MAC protocol of the WSN,
effectively preventing nodes from entering their duty/sleep cycle an wasting their
batteries [1].
Figure 1.4. DoS Attacks Example
Jamming is the primary physical layer DoS attack against WSN. In a jamming
attack, the attacker constantly emits radio frequency signals that do not follow an
underlying MAC protocol, thus any member of the network in the affected area will
not be able to send or receive any packet. The energy requirements of this attack are
very high, as the attacker must flood the communication channel with noise. There
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are some optimizations to the basic jamming attack, such as the random jamming,
where the attacker alternates between sleep and jamming to save energy, or the
reactive jamming, where the jam signal is transmitted only when the attacker senses
traffic [2]. Finally, another clever optimization that reduces the energy consumption
of the attacker is to target MAC protocols on the link layer [1], [5], e.g. by jamming
only request-to-send (RTS) packets. As a side note, it should be mentioned that
DoS attacks can be performed by using some of the attacks explained in other
categories [6], although those attacks are usually more complex and can be used
to disrupt other functional elements of the network (e.g. the authenticity of the
physical/control data).
1.3.3 Node Compromise Attacks
Most of the previously shown attacks can be performed by outsiders: attackers that
do not have access to the network elements and services. However, if an attacker have
access to the network as one of its elements, i.e. as an insider, it is possible to perform
attacks that are more subtle and devastating. The first step to become an insider is
to compromise a node, usually by performing node compromise attacks. A sensor
node can be considered compromised when an attacker, through various means,
can either read or modify its internal memory. The ultimate goal of this attack
is, in most cases, to obtain the secret keys stored within a trusted node in order to
infiltrate a mole inside the network. Attacks that can lead to a node compromise are
invasive or non-invasive. In an invasive attack, the attacker physically breaks into
the hardware by modifying its hardware structure (e.g. using focused ion beam, or
drilling a hole in the storage media). On the other hand, in non-invasive attacks the
data is taken from the hardware device without any form of structural modification
done to the device itself. Invasive attacks usually fall under the category of side
channel attacks, as these attacks obtain confidential data directly from the chips of
the nodes. batteries [1].
Regarding non-invasive attacks, they usually take advantage of the hardware
interfaces of the nodes. One example is the JTAG interface [8]. This interface enables
accessing and controlling of the signal levels on the processor chip, and is also used
for debugging purposes. Through the use of an AVR ICE JTAG programming tool,
11
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Figure 1.5. Node Compromise Attacks Example
an attacker can dump all the information from the program flash, the EEPROM and
also the SRAM. As a result, the attacker can replicate the functionality of the node
to facilitate the integration of the malicious node. While most of these non-invasive
attacks simply aim to obtain information from the node, there exist more advanced
attacks that are capable of injecting code inside a working sensor node. For example,
it is possible to exploit the serial bootstrap loader (BSL) of certain models of the
Texas Instruments MSP430 low-power microcontrollers with the aim of extracting
or replacing the firmware [9]. Even more, it is possible to inject malicious code
remotely in AVR-based nodes by exploiting buffer overflow vulnerabilities [10].
1.3.4 Side Channel Attacks
In order to compromise a node, it is also possible to attack its hardware through side-
channel attacks. The main objective of side channel attacks is to obtain confidential
data stored within the node. Most attackers focus on obtaining security credentials
such as secret keys, since these credentials will provide the attacker with a powerful
tool capable of crafting more powerful attacks. Side channel attacks can be classified
12
1 – Introduction
in the following categories: passive vs. active and non-invasive vs. semi-invasive vs.
invasive. Passive attacks extract information from the device merely by observing
physical properties of the devices, while active attacks involve the manipulation
(tampering) of the device itself. In contrast, non-invasive attacks do not manipulate
the device substantially, while semi-invasive attacks depackage the device but do
not make direct electrical contact with the chip’s surface, and invasive attacks have
practically no limits to the measures which can be taken to extract the information
of the device (e.g. probing station, focused ion beam). Note that not all semi-
invasive or invasive attacks are active attacks: passive semi-invasive attacks may try
to just read sensitive data from memory components, and passive invasive attacks
can use a probe station to sense valuable data signals.
Figure 1.6. Side Channel Attacks Example
Specific examples of side-channel attacks are power analysis attacks, electro-
magnetic attacks, and timing attacks [7]. In power analysis attacks, the adversary
studies the power consumption of the devices, focusing mainly on the energy used by
cryptographic operations. For performing these attacks, it is possible to either use
single power traces to look for distinguishing features (Simple power analysis, SPA)
or use larger numbers of power traces alongside with powerful statistical methods
(Differential power analysis, DPA). Electromagnetic attacks (or EM attacks) are
similar to power analysis attacks, since they also analyse power traces with sim-
ple (SEMA) and differential (DEMA) methods. However, they derive the power
traces from electromagnetic emanations, collected by EM probes. Beyond simple
and differential analysis, EM attacks can employ more advanced techniques, such as
adding spatial information to the measurement data, or analysing the frequency do-
main rather than the time domain. Finally, as the execution time of cryptographic
algorithms often shows slight differences dependent on the input of the algorithm,
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timing attacks exploits the variance in execution time for different branches in the
cryptosystem.
1.3.5 Impersonation Attacks
Once an attacker becomes an insider, it is easier to perform impersonation attacks.
For this particular class of attack, the goal of the adversary is to make the victim be-
lieve that it is communicating with an impersonated entity. As a result, a malicious
node will interact with other nodes as one trusted member, but at the same time
it can manipulate the internal behaviour of the network whenever the adversary
needs it. Impersonation attacks can either replicate and insert duplicate nodes back
Figure 1.7. Impersonation Attacks Example
into selected regions of the network (node replication attack or clone attack) or use
multiple identities to deceive other sensor nodes (sybil attack). In node replication
attacks, the attacker only needs to subvert one node in order to create an army
of clones following his orders. These clones can not only manipulate the internal
operations of the network, but also exert a strong influence over those processes that
require of a majority vote. As for sybil attacks, a sybil node can either fabricate
new identities or steal them from legitimate nodes [11]. Sybil nodes can be able to
execute powerful attacks, disrupting several of the functions that may be conducted
on a WSN including data aggregation, voting, routing and fair resource allocation.
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1.3.6 Protocol Specific Attacks
Beyond impersonation, an insider can perform protocol-specific attacks, attacking
those ”core” protocols needed by the network such as routing protocols, aggregation
protocols, and time synchronization protocols. Attacks against routing protocols in
a WSN fall into one of the following categories [12]: corruption of the internal con-
trol information such as the routing tables (Spoofed Routing Information), selective
forwarding of the packets that traverse a malicious node depending on some crite-
ria (Selective Forwarding), creation of a ”wormhole” that captures the information
at one location and replays them in another location either unchanged (Wormhole
attack) or tampered (Sinkhole attack), creation of false control packets during the
deployment of the network (HELLO Flood Attack), and creation of false acknowl-
edge information (Acknowledgement Spoofing).
Data aggregation protocols combine information coming from the same area in
order to reduce the overall communication overhead. As these protocols need to use
routing protocols in order to fuse information and forward it to the base station,
every attack that target the routing infrastructure can also be used to hinder the
aggregation process. Most of these attacks try to discard data, either selectively
or indiscriminately. Though losing data is a problematic situation for the network,
this is not the primary type of attack against aggregation: most attacks focus on
falsifying information. If an aggregator node is being controlled by an adversary,
it can easily ignore the data received from its neighbours and create false reports.
Moreover, trusted aggregators can still receive false data from faulty nodes or from
nodes being controlled by an adversary.
Regarding time synchronization, it is needed because as the time obtained from
clocks of different nodes may differ due to different starting times (offset), inaccurate
quartz crystals (skew), or ambient influence (drift), it is necessary to synchronize
these clocks in order to maintain a global notion of time [13]. Most time synchroniza-
tion protocols rely on two neighbouring nodes adjusting their local clocks by means
of sender-receiver (mutual synchronization) and receiver-receiver (beacon signals)
protocols. In these scenarios, the main objective of an attacker is to deceive other
nodes into thinking that an incorrect time is accurate. Besides internal attacks,
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where the attacker can out-rightly lie about the value of its internal clock, an at-
tacker can use the following external attacks: manipulation of the contents of the
negotiation messages through message forging and replay, and delaying the messages
exchanged in the negotiation process by means of a pulse-delay attack.
1.4 Security Requirement
As we have previously seen, sensor networks are vulnerable to external and internal
attacks. The effects of those attacks in the network are not trivial, since they can
render the services of the network useless. It is clear that there is the need of
using security mechanisms either to prevent the attacks from influencing over the
functionality of the network or to minimize the adverse effects of such attacks. By
using the security mechanisms, it can be possible to enforce in sensor networks the
following security properties:
1.4.1 Confidentiality
This property tries to fulfil the following principle: A given message must not be
understood by anyone other than the desired recipients. While confidentiality is an
important security property, it may not be mandatory in certain scenarios where the
data is public by itself (i.e. the temperature of a street) and no other information can
be derived from it. However, there are particular situations and scenarios where the
physical data obtained by the network can be deemed as sensitive, and should not be
read by external entities. Data can be considered sensitive due to its inherent nature
(e.g. patient data such as temperature), the nature of the context (e.g. a private
household, a military setting), or the nature of the sensed entities (e.g. a protected
animal like a panda). Besides, certain control data exchanged by the nodes, such as
security credentials and secret keys, must be hidden from unauthorized entities.
1.4.2 Integrity
This property states that the data produced and consumed by the sensor network
must not be maliciously altered. Unlike confidentiality, integrity is, in most cases, a
16
1 – Introduction
mandatory property. The wireless channel can be accessed by anyone, thus any peer
(outsiders and insiders) can manipulate the contents of the messages that traverse
the network. Even more, data loss or damage may occur due to the harsh com-
munication environment, and in the worst case the network will accept corrupted
data. As the main objective of a sensor network is to provide services to its users,
the sensor network will fail in its purpose if the reliability of those services can not
assured due to inconsistencies in the information.
1.4.3 Authentication
Informally, data authentication allows a receiver to verify that the data is really sent
by the claimed sender. This security property is quite important in sensor networks.
In fact, without authentication the barrier between external and internal members
of the network would not exist, as any outsider could claim that it is a registered
member of the network. Moreover, even existing network members could easily pose
as their neighbours. This situation would encourage many problematic situations,
such as adversaries forging the whole packet stream by injecting additional packets,
and nodes accepting false administrative tasks (e.g. network reprogramming).
1.4.4 Authorization
This property states that only authorized entities (sensor nodes and base station) can
be able to perform certain operations in the network (e.g. information providing,
controlling the system). Since a sensor network can be considered as one single
entity, where all nodes perform the same tasks and acknowledge the role of the base
station as manager and supervisor, it could be supposed that any authenticated
device is inherently authorized to perform its tasks. Nevertheless, there might be
situations (e.g. when nodes actuate over physical systems) where some members of
the network need to have a proper authorization in order to perform certain tasks.
In these situations authorization must be taken into account.
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1.4.5 Self-Organization
One specific property related to the autonomous nature of sensor networks is self-
organization: sensor nodes must be independent and flexible enough to autonomously
react against problematic situations, organizing and healing themselves. These prob-
lematic situations can be caused either by external or internal attackers trying to
influence over the behaviour of the elements of the system or by extraordinary cir-
cumstances in the environment or in the network itself. This is an essential property
to the functioning of a sensor network and optimal resource use during its lifetime.
It is desirable that all possible problems that may occur can be detected and pre-
vented without any margin of error. However, as the previous statement may not
be realistic, nodes should be able to at least adapt their activities to assure the
continuity of the services.
1.4.6 Non-repudiation
While non-repudiation is not considered in the existing literature as an important
security property for most sensor networks, it may be necessary to at least consider
its applicability in certain contexts where sensor nodes monitor critical components,
as acknowledging the reception and processing of serious alarms is of key importance.
This property is described as follows: a node cannot deny sending a message it has
previously sent. Note that non-repudiation can also consider repudiation of receipt,
where the recipient tries to deny the reception of the message. For achieving non-
repudiation, it is necessary to produce certain ’evidence’ in case a dispute arises.
Using the evidence, it is possible to prove that a device of the network performed a
task.
1.4.7 Privacy
These security properties are very important in those scenarios where the location
and identities of the base station and the nodes that generated information should
be hidden or protected. For example, any network that monitors endangered species
should provide no clues on their physical location. Also, in a battlefield, it would
be important to not be able to distinguish whether a certain signals belongs to a
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soldier or a vehicle. In contrast, there are situations where this property should
not be enforced: in an earthquake rescue situation locating the source nodes (if the
nodes are worn by, for example, dogs) is an absolute must. Note that this property
can transcend beyond the technological dimension and affect its social environment,
since sensor networks could be used as a surveillance tool to collect data about the
behaviour of human beings.
1.5 Key Management and Secure Channels
All devices that want to open a secure channel with other nodes must share some
security credentials, i.e. secret keys. Key management systems (KMS) aim to solve
the problem of creating, distributing, and maintaining those secret keys. The design
of a KMS for sensor networks is not a trivial task, though: it is not advisable to
rely on centralized entities due to the distributed and self-configurable nature of
the network. Also, the existing constraints of sensor nodes (memory, computational
capabilities) may discourage the use of resource-intensive algorithms for most sce-
narios. Finally, there are other factors, such as the potential size of the network,
the connectivity of its nodes, the energy spent in the key setup processes, etc, that
influence over the design of a KMS as well.
Due to their importance, the Key Management Systems for Wireless Sensor
Networks have received increasing attention on the scientific literature, spanning
many different types of protocols [25]. In fact, since one of the most important
link-layer standards in sensor networks, IEEE 802.15.4, does not specify how secret
keys should be exchanged, it is essential to utilize one of these protocols. These
protocols can be classified into four major frameworks. Although the major purpose
of all these frameworks is to bootstrap the secret keys that are needed by the link
layer, their underlying mechanisms and design goals are different.
1.5.1 Key Pool Framework
This is one of the first and most important KMS frameworks. The basic scheme
behind this framework is quite simple [51]: the network designer creates a ”key
pool”, a large set of precalculated secret keys, and before the network deployment
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every node in the network is assigned unique ”key chain”, i.e. a small subset of
keys from the ”key pool” (Key pre-distribution phase). After the deployment, the
nodes can interchange the identification numbers of the keys from their ”key chains”,
trying to find a common shared secret key (shared-key discovery phase). If two nodes
do not share any key, they will try to find a ”key path” between them in order to
negotiate a pairwise key (path-key establishment phase). The major design goal of
the protocols that belong to this framework is to assure a limited secure connectivity
between nodes, regardless of the size of the network.
1.5.2 Mathematical Framework
Certain KMS protocols use mathematical concepts (Linear Algebra, Combinatorics,
and Algebraic Geometry) for calculating the pairwise keys of the nodes. The foun-
dation of the Linear Algebra schemes is the Blom’s scheme [52]. In this scheme,
every node i can calculate the pairwise key it shares with another node j by solving
A(i)G(j), whereas G is a public Vandermonde matrix and A is calculated using a
symmetric random secret matrix D. On the field of Combinatorics, the General-
ized Quadrangle and Symmetric Design models [53] are the most important. Using
Generalized Quadrangles GQ(s, t) or Finite Projective Planes FPP(q), a network
designer can construct a key chain of size s + 1 or q + 1, respectively. Finally, on
the field of Algebraic Geometry, the basic primitive is the Bivariate Polynomial [54].
By using a bivariate polynomial f, every node A in the network is able to obtain a
pairwise key with another node y by solving f(A, y). All these protocols allow the
creation of pairwise keys between nodes without major communication overhead.
On the other hand, these designs are often difficult to apply, and they are not very
scalable.
1.5.3 Negotiation Framework
All protocols that generate their keys through mutual agreement, negotiating keys
with their closer neighbours just after the deployment of the network, can be con-
sidered part of this framework. They are usually applied under the assumption that
there is little or no treat against the integrity of the network in its first moments
of life [55]. Nevertheless, it is possible to use other mechanisms and protocols (such
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as the Guy Fawkes protocol [56]) in order to assure the authenticity of the peers in
any step of the network deployment. Other protocols that can be included inside
this framework are those protocols that organize the network into dynamic or static
clusters [57].
1.5.4 Public Key Framework
Most of the previous frameworks rely only on Symmetric Key Cryptography. How-
ever, Public Key Cryptography can also be used to securely bootstrap the pairwise
key of two nodes over a public communication channel. In these protocols, two nodes
just need to interchange their public keys and some information (through protocols
such as ECDH and ECMQV) to effectively create their pairwise secret keys. While
constrained sensor nodes can be able to use PKC through Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy, the amount of memory required for the implementation and the time and energy
needed to complete the negotiation is, in most cases, substantially higher than other
KMS frameworks. However, PKC-based KMS usually have better properties than
the systems of other frameworks.
1.5.5 Discussion and Open Issues
As for the actual state of the art, every one of these frameworks contains many
different protocols, and these protocols can implement specific optimizations (e.g.
use of deployment knowledge, optimize the message exchange, tweak the behaviour
of the protocols, combine protocols from different frameworks) in order to improve
their features and be more useful for certain contexts. In fact, there exists certain
methods that are able to select the most adequate KMS for a certain context by using
the application requirements as an input [27]. By using these tools, it is possible to
conclude that the actual state of the art for KMS in sensor networks is good enough
for protecting certain applications. However, there are some issues that remain to
be solved, such as the creation of protocols with better resilience (resistance against
stolen credentials) and extensibility (capability of adding new nodes) properties.
One interesting detail is that, for most applications, simple KMS protocols such the
basic polynomial-based and Blom schemes provide most of the properties needed
by the applications. The reason is simple: most real-world applications have a
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number of nodes ranging from 50 to 1000. And for this size, simpler protocols
are good enough. Another interesting point is the use of PKC. For every single
situation PKC seems to be the ideal protocol, and in fact PKC-based protocols
such as EDH and ECMQV provide good properties like excellent resilience and
extensibility. Nevertheless, there might be situations where simpler KMS protocols
can provide the properties needed by the applications.
Content Name
Selector
Nonce
Content Name
Signature
Signed Info
Data
Interest Packet Data Packet
(Order preference, 
publisher filter, etc.)
(Digest algorithm, 
witness etc.)
(Publisher ID, Key 
locator, etc.)
Figure 1.8. CCN packet structure, hierarchical naming and forwarding engine
1.6 Content Centric Networking
Developed at PARC by Van Jacobson and his team [3], CCN is also known as Infor-
mation Centric Networking or Named Data Networking [4]. Building on the observa-
tion that today’s communications are more oriented towards content retrieval (web,
P2P, etc.) than point-to-point communications (VoIP, IM, etc.), CCN proposes a
radical revision of the Internet architecture switching from named hosts (TCP/IP
protocols) to named data to best match its current usage. In a nutshell, content
is addressable, routable, self-sufficient and authenticated, while locations no longer
matter. Data is seen and identified directly by a routable name instead of a location
(the address of the server). Consequently, data is directly requested at the network
level (not its holder, no need of DNS). To improve content diffusion, CCN relies on
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close data storage because storage is proven cheaper than bandwidth: every content
- particularly popular one - can be replicated and stored on any CCN node, even
untrustworthy. People looking for particular content can securely retrieve it in a
P2P-way from the best locations available.
1.6.1 CCN Paradigm
CCN has two main types of packets, Interest and Data as shown in figure 1.8. A
user who wants to access a given content sends out an Interest packet, specifying
the name of the content (as defined by CCN nomenclature ContentName) to all its
available faces. Faces can be anything which can serve as medium for transmitting
and receiving data. A node which receives this packet and that can ”satisfy” the
Interest then sends out the corresponding Data packet onto the face from which it
received the Interest. By definition, CCN nodes are stateful and only forward Data
on the back path if an Interest was emitted beforehand.
Data can only ”satisfy” a specific Interest if the ContentName of Interest packet
is a prefix of the Data packet. CCN names are defined in [3] as ”opaque, binary
objects composed of an (explicitly specified) number of components”. This structure
allows a fast and efficient prefix-based lookup similar to the IP lookup currently used.
It also allows names to be context dependent i.e. /ThisRoom/Printer references a
printer in the current room. This new routing paradigm is based on a plain-text
hierarchical naming instead of regular host’s IP addresses so that names are directly
intuitive and do not need an indirection mechanism between names and contents (no
need of DNS, DHT). An example of this hierarchical naming structure is presented
in 1.9 for a content named ”ccnx:/uni.lu/videos/intro.avi”
CCN nodes are composed of three main table structures, presented in 1.10, which
handle the forwarding of packets. At the arrival of an Interest packet on any given
face, the engine performs a longest-match lookup on its structures and action is
taken depending on the lookup result. The first structure to be searched is the
Content Store. It can be seen as a buffer memory of past Data packets on the
current router. IP routers also have such a buffer but it is purged once the packet
is forwarded. The Content Store however preserves the Data packet based on LRU
scheme and enables therefore a fast retrieval of currently popular demands. If there
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(b)
(a)
(c)Figure 1.9. CCN packet structure, hierarchical naming and forwarding engine
is a match, the router forwards its local copy of the content to the face on which
it received the Interest and updates its Content Store accordingly. If there is no
match in the Content Store, the lookup is launched on the next structure which is
the PIT. The PIT stands for Pending Interest Table and keeps record of Interests
waiting to be resolved upstream by other content source(s). If a received Interest
matches an entry in the PIT, the engine compares the faces recorded for that entry.
If there is already one existing, no update is made. Otherwise, the face form which
the Interest was emitted is simply added to the list of already waiting faces.
If no match-up is found in the PIT then the engine searches in its last structure:
the FIB. The Forward Information Base keeps record of potential content source(s)
and works similarly to its IP counterpart except that it stores a list of possible
providers for a given name rather than a single one only. If a match is found, the
engine then creates a PIT entry for the given Interest and it is forwarded to all faces
specified in the FIB entry. If no match could be made, it means that the current
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(c)Figure 1.10. CCN packet structure, hierarchical naming and forwarding engine
router has no information on the demanded content and discards the Interest.
CCN has also built-in strategy and security layers. The strategy layer is used
to define policies to select which face is the best for given contents. In fact, due to
its design, FIB entries contain multiple faces. CCN can send periodically Interests
to all outgoing faces without fearing of loops and thereby testing which of the faces
responds the fastest. This one will be used as preferred until another round of this
experiment yields to a different result. Criteria for experimentation interval can be
a threshold of packets sent, a time out, change of the SSID, etc.
The security layer ensures that the content received by a previously announced
Interest is authentic. As in CCN only the content matters but not the route it takes,
the only thing which needs to be checked for authenticity, consistency and integrity
is the content itself which reversely means that end-to-end encryption is not needed
any more. Key management is another issue often discussed. We will review some
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of that work in the next section.
1.6.2 CCN Security Schemes
Content Centric Networking improves the security of Internet communications in
many ways. First of all, CCN messages cannot be sent toward a node without any
prior Interest request from that node (Data cannot be pushed, only pulled) which
makes the classical denial of service scheme inefficient as the attacker would first
need his target to generate a lot of Interests to enable the DoS attack.
The paradigm shift of CCN makes every node capable to answer a Data request.
To ensure the security of communications all data is authenticated, contrary to the
connections it traverses. The security scheme should provide better results. For
example, a secure connection to a mail server does not avoid SPAM mails to be
received while with CCN, SPAM mails will fail the authentication as untrustworthy
Data and will be discarded. So, CCN strongly relies on cryptography to authenticate
the contents so that users can clearly know who emitted the content and can discard
those from untrustworthy sources to avoid malware. Also, encryption is used to
ensure privacy.
CCN provides native security and privacy by encryption with lower overhead
than current protocols [3]. To securely authenticate content, CCN has to bind the
content name, the content itself and the content provider. To do so, the following
information is embedded in each CCN data packet: Signature(Name;Content; Sign-
Info). SignInfo includes: cryptographic digest or fingerprint of publishers key, key
or key location. When a node receives the key, it verifies it with the certification
authority, as in the PKI approach. The successful authentication of the message
ensures the integrity and security, but not the privacy of the content.
In [14], Smetters et al. propose the following description: each new content
creates a mapping triple: where M is the Mapping, N the Name, C the Content.
Every piece of data must include a way to retrieve the key of publisher and mapping
evidence. In this case, the authors include in the packet the mapping from the name
of the content to the provider-assigned name, instead of the actual content name.
26
1 – Introduction
Content can be authenticated by every node using public key signatures and dif-
ferent signature algorithms are available to find a trade-off between the needed secu-
rity and performances. The key-stone of CCN security is the trust in the publisher.
To ease key management in CCN, Jacobson et al. propose to see an organization as
a content name and public key as 3 a Data. They propose to use the SDSI/SPKI
where keys are mapped to identities via namespaces (CCN names) so that there is
no single source of trust like the current certification authorities. This scheme opens
evidence based security where data provenance (traceability).
If CCN improves security in some points, it also raises the possibility of new
kinds of attacks. For example, unlike terminal hosts which are less exposed to at-
tacks, CCN routers are more vulnerable than IP routers because of their stateful
nature and the complexity of the management of their inner tables, which are es-
sential for performance and quality of service. All these new algorithms and their
implementations need to be assessed from a security point of view before being
trustable.
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1.7 Thesis outline and previously published pa-
pers
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. The chapter 1 describes the introduction
of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), IP-Based Wireless Sensor Networks (6LoW-
PAN), Content Centric Networking (CCN), their security threats and their security
requirements. The background about the key management schemes in these different
technologies is discussed in chapter 2. The proposed key management algorithm for
the wireless sensor networks based on the key pool approach is described in chapter
3 while the online key generation approach is described in chapter 4. Chapter 5
describes the online key generation approach for IP-Based wireless sensor networks
while the key management approach for the content centric networking is discussed
in chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
In secure ad hoc networks, authorized nodes access the network based on network
initialization, authentication and secure communication. Authentication forms the
core in security, where nodes exchange data based on key management. Trusted
Third Party (TPP) or Certificate Authority (CA) function as trust infrastructure
and enable the nodes to access or leave the network. The main feature of security
protocols is key management, which includes key distribution and key update.
Most security protocols and mechanisms need cryptographic primitives in order
to integrate the security properties into their operations. These cryptographic prim-
itives are Symmetric Key Cryptography (SKC), Public Key Cryptography (PKC),
and Hash functions [40]. Symmetric Key Cryptography (SKC) can provide confi-
dentiality and integrity to the communication channel, and require that both the
origin and destination share the same security credential (i.e. secret key), which
is utilized for both encryption and decryption. As a result, any third-party that
does not have such secret key cannot access the information exchange. Public Key
Cryptography (PKC), also known as asymmetric cryptography, is useful for secure
broadcasting and authentication purposes. It requires of two keys: a key called
secret key, which has to be kept private, and another key named public key, which
is publicly known. Any operation done with the private key can only be reversed
with the public key, and vice versa. As for (cryptographic) hash functions, they
are used to create ”digital fingerprints” of data. This property can be used to build
other cryptographic primitives like the Message Authentication Code (MAC), which
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Figure 2.1. Cryptographic Types
provides authenticity and integrity of the messages. These primitives alone are not
enough to protect a system, since they just provide the confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation properties. Nevertheless, without these primi-
tives, it would be nearly impossible to create secure and functional protocols.
The development of optimal implementations of security primitives for sensor
nodes is a very advanced research field, with solutions that can be easily used in
new sensor deployments. In the area of Symmetric Key Cryptography, there are
two types of primitives: Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers. Block Ciphers are
more flexible and powerful, while Stream Ciphers are simpler and faster. One of
the most important block ciphers is the Advanced Encryption Standard or AES,
which is the encryption standard used by all U.S. government organizations for
the protection of sensitive information. While this encryption primitive is not one
of the fastest primitives, it is usable in sensor nodes: one of the most optimized
software implementation of AES-128 achieves an encryption speed of 286.35 Kbps,
a RAM requirement of 260 bytes, and a code size of 5160 bytes running on a 8 Mhz
Texas Instrument’s MSP430 microcontroller with no operative system [41]. There
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are even other block ciphers that, when implemented on software, offer an adequate
balance between resource consumption and security. For example, the Skipjack
cipher is slightly less secure than AES-128 due to its key size (80 bits), but some
implementations have achieved a reasonably low encryption overhead per byte (25
µs) and a low memory overhead (code size of 2600 bytes).
Regarding stream ciphers, one of the most known ciphers is RC4, which is very
simple and has an impressive speed. Although it is possible to implement it in a
sensor node with just 428 bytes of code size [42], its inherent weaknesses (which are
mostly concentrated on the initialization phase [43]) make advisable the use of other
stream ciphers in new applications. Precisely, the eSTREAM project (organized by
the EU ECRYPT network [28]) aimed to identify new stream ciphers that could
be used even in constrained devices. Some of the ciphers of the resulting portfolio
provide good results [44] in sensor nodes: the Salsa 20/12 algorithm requires 1412
bytes of code size in AVR platforms and it provides a throughput of 43700 bytes per
second, and the Sosemanuk algorithm requires more memory (9092 bytes of code
size in AVR platforms) but provides a higher throughput (67660 bytes per second)3.
Public Key Cryptography was considered to be unattainable for sensor node plat-
forms, but that assumption was shattered a long time ago. The approach that made
PKC possible and usable in sensor nodes was Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC),
which is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. ECC has
smaller requirements both in computation and memory storage, due to its small key
sizes and its simpler primitives. One of the most known software implementations of
ECC, TinyECC [45], implements ECC-based signature generation and verification
(ECDSA), encryption and decryption (ECIES), and key agreement (ECDH). Note
that the computational and memory requirements of these algorithms are not small
(e.g. ECDSA requires 19308 ROM and 1510 RAM for the MICAz, generating a
signature in 2s. and verifying it in 2.43s), although the implementation of these
primitives is constantly evolving and improving [46].
In fact, the improvements on the implementations of ECC primitives have al-
lowed the existence of more complex PKC primitives in sensor nodes, such as
identity-based cryptography (IBC). In IBC systems, only the identity of the sen-
sors must be exchanged, and as a result there is no need to send either public keys
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or certificates. This saves energy as there is less data to be sent through the com-
munication channel, although IBC is also very costly in terms of memory and CPU
usage. One of the most optimal implementation of pairings executes the ηT (P,Q)
pairing on 1.71 seconds, requiring 4.17 KB of RAM and 23.66 KB of code size run-
ning on a 8 Mhz Texas Instrument’s MSP430 microcontroller [47]. While it would
seem that this primitive is not useful in sensor nodes, there may be certain contexts
where it could be useful, such as underwater sensor networks.
As for hash functions, some standards like SHA-1 can be easily included in sensor
nodes: an unoptimized implementation needs of 122 s for digesting one byte [48].
Note that, as practical collision attacks can be found against SHA-1 [49], NIST is
currently working on the selection of a new hash standard [50]. The work on this
new standard is focused on PC-like platforms, although performance on embedded
systems will not be overlooked. As a result, it is possible that new hash functions
applicable to sensor nodes will appear soon. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to use
hash functions to assure the integrity of a message if special modes of operation
(such as CMAC) are used, although they require of specific block ciphers that could
implement that functionality.
2.1 Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks
The management of cryptographic keys is an important issue in resource constrained
wireless sensor networks. The management of these cryptographic key should be
secure and should not give a chance to the intruder to use those keys to compromise
some communication links. By keeping in mind the resource constrained nature of
wireless sensor networks, a number of key management schemes have been introduce
to meet the wireless sensor networks requirements and provide a required level of
security. The details of these existing key management schemes are described next.
2.1.1 Network Key Management
Initially, the network key approach was suggested for wireless sensor networks. In
this approach, a single unique common key was used by each node in the network
to encrypt and decrypt the data. For example, if a sender A wants to send some
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data to receiver B, and the single unique common network key is K, then A sends
data to B as
Encrypted data = C = {data}K (2.1)
When receiver B receives the encrypted data C, it will use the same key K to
decrypt C to get the original data as
Decrypted data = Data = {C}K (2.2)
Although this approach suited well the constrained nature of wireless sensor net-
works, it is not very secure. For example, if an attacker captures any node in the
network, he can easily obtain the secret key K from that node and can compromise
any communication link of the network and can launch a number of attacks easily.
2.1.2 Group Key Management
A group key is used for secure group communication in a scenario where sensors in a
group can send and receive messages among group members, such that outsiders are
unable to glean any information, even when they are able to intercept the messages.
Recently, an extensive set of papers have studied group key management issues
in WSNs. In [15], a pre-distribution and local collaboration-based group rekeying
scheme was proposed. However, this scheme requires each node to store all the
secret shares of its neighbor’s key polynomials. Therefore, the communication cost
and storage cost is too high to be applied into large scale WSNs. This scheme also
suffers from node isolation. If a large fraction of neighbors are compromised, a node
may not be able to update its group key and thus be isolated. In [16], a group key
distribution method via local collaboration was proposed. This method is simple
and has high resilience to node compromise, but it did not consider node isolation,
and each node needs to store all key information of each update session which incurs
additional storage cost.
In [17], Zhang developed a group key management scheme to address the draw-
backs of existing group key management schemes. The design of this scheme is
motivated by the advantage of hierarchical structure of WSNs. Instead of letting
each node collaborate with neighbors to acquire group key, in this scheme, only
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cluster heads generate and distribute the group key to the nodes within the cluster.
2.1.3 Online key generation system
In the online key generation approach, each node generates the secret keys by itself.
This approach reduces the memory overhead of each node by storing only few keys
but it consume some amount of its energy during the generation of secret keys. Most
of the online key generation approaches are based on the elliptic curve cryptography
because it provides the same level of security with a shorter key length as com-
pared to the standard public key infrastructure. Also the elliptic curve approach is
not computationally expensive because of the addition operations while the public
key approach contains lot of multiplication and division operations which are more
expensive and make it not suitable for wireless sensor networks.
For example, Sanchez and Baldus [18] apply an Finite Projective Plane (FPP)
design to the pre-distribution of Blundo polynomial shares. Their approach enables
direct pairwise key establishment for a large number of nodes independent of the
physical connectivity of the WSN. To reduce the memory overhead and support node
mobility among different networks, Maerien [19] proposed the MAnagement of Secret
keYs protocol (MASY) for mobile WSNs which assigns to a node only one symmetric
key, shared only with the back-end server of its network, and which assumes a trust
relationship between the newly entered network and the node’s old parent network.
Sajid [21] presented an online generation of secret key by storing a small number
of generation key in each sensor node before the deployment of HSNs. Two low
capability nodes request a high capability node to discover a shared generation key
between them and use a random number to generate a secret communication key.
In order to support node addition and node revocation, Poornima [22] proposed
a tree based key management scheme for HSNs while Xinyu Jin [23] presented an
Unpredictable Software-based Attestation Solution (USAS) for compromised node
detection in mobile sensor networks.
2.1.4 Key Pool Framework
Although the on-line key generation approach reduces the memory overhead, some-
times the computational cost of the key is a critical issue. For example, if the
36
2 – Background
network is deployed in some hostile and unattended location, the online key gen-
eration approach reduces the network lifetime and the battery of each sensor node
needs to be replaced more frequently. To cope with this issue, key pool framework
was proposed which does not include any computational cost and also increases the
network lifetime.
Perrig et al. [24] presented SPINS, a centralized keying method for sensor net-
works in which each node contains a secret key whose corresponding key is stored in
the base station and uses one-way hash chains for creating an epoch-delayed key re-
lease mechanism for the use in authenticated broadcast. However, two sensor nodes
cannot have a common secret key directly. If two nodes A and B want to establish
a communication key with each other, A sends a request to B, which creates and
forwards a token to the base station. The base station then generates a session key
for A and B, encrypts it with the secret keys that it shares with A and B and then
sends encrypted data to A and B respectively. Since the nodes use the base station
as a trusted server to establish a secret key, this scheme will not work if the base
station is not reachable or has a high communication overhead, especially in the
case of multi-hop communication.
Eschenauer and Gligor [51] proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme that
does not require the base station for the key establishment between any two nodes.
According to this scheme, a set of randomly selected keys from a large pool is as-
signed to each sensor node before the network deployment. Two nodes communicate
directly to establish a secret communication key only if they have at least one key
in common. To do so, the two nodes shares their key pool information (i.e. key IDs)
with each other and then they find a common key between the two key pools. Once
they find a common key, the two nodes uses that key for secret key establishment.
If they find more than one common key, then they first agree on single common
key followed by secret key establishment. In case, if the two nodes do not find any
common key between their key pools, then they get help of some intermediate node
who has a shared common key between these two communicating nodes. So the two
communicating nodes establish secret key through an intermediate nodes. Although
this scheme does not contains any key calculation, but it consumes lot of memory
space of a sensor node. For example, to increase the network connectivity in terms
of key sharing probability, each node must assign a large number of keys from a
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given key pool. If the network size is large, the given key pool size must be large
to maintain a certain level of security which also increase the assigned key pool
size to each node to maintain the same level of network connectivity as well. But
assigning large key pool to each node also increases the security threats because if
an attacker compromise one node, it will get its keys and will use it to compromise
network links with other nodes. However, Chan [26] improved the security of [51]
by introducing the ”q keys” concept. To establish a secret key, two nodes must
share at least q keys but this scheme requires storing a large number of keys in
each sensor node than [51] to maintain the same level of network connectivity. But
this scheme is also prone to the node compromission attacks. Liu [29] presented a
key establishment scheme using a prior knowledge of node deployment coupled with
Rabin’s scheme [30] to achieve a high degree of connectivity (while reducing the
memory cost) and network resilience against the node capture attacks. Key pools
are divided according to the deployment regions and each node is assigned keys from
those key pools. This increases the probability of finding a common key between the
key pools of two communicating nodes. Zhang [31] presented the NPKPS pairwise
key pre-distribution scheme for WSNs to achieve better security, connectivity and
efficiency and less memory cost compared to [51]. Efficient authentication schemes
are proposed in [32] and [33] which improve over past work in terms of security,
authentication overhead and storage requirements.
In order to present a key management scheme that reduces energy cost and sup-
ports node mobility, Kim [34] proposed a level-based key management scheme for
multicast communication that has reasonable routing overhead and low mobility
management overhead. For mobility supported cluster-based WSNs, a two-layered
dynamic key management scheme was proposed by Chuang [35] while polynomial-
based key pre-distribution scheme for mobile sensor networks was proposed by
Blundo [36].
For HSNs, Du [37] presented an unbalanced key pre-distribution scheme to im-
prove network connectivity, reduce memory overhead and provide better network
resilience compared with existing key management schemes for homogeneous sensor
networks. Nodes with high capabilities are assigned m keys, while nodes with low
capabilities are assigned l keys, m >> l. Zhang [39] presented a group oriented
key management scheme for HSNs in which a large key pool is split into a sub key
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pool for each group, while a routing-driven key management scheme based ECC is
presented by Du [58]. Their results show better connectivity and network resilience
than [51], [37]. Symmetric key distribution based on public key cryptography us-
ing prior knowledge of sensor deployment location provides better resilience against
node capture, as well as lower memory cost and computational overhead [59].
2.2 Key Management in Content Centric Network-
ing
Since little investigation has been made in securing CCN, there is no specific key
management scheme for that. Here we describe some of the existing key management
schemes proposed in the literature for the static and mobile ad hoc networks which
is a field of networking where key dissemination in the network has been investigated
for years.
Basically, cryptography is divided into two main categories (1) Symmetric key
cryptography (2) Asymmetric key cryptography. In symmetric key cryptography,
every node in the network is assigned N-1 keys where N is the total number of nodes
in the networks. This is not suitable for a large networks because each node is
required to store large number of keys. In asymmetric cryptography, each node is
assigned a pair of keys (i.e. public key and private key) for secure communication
with other nodes in the network. Recent research works in cryptography are mainly
based on the traditional public key infrastructure (PKI: [60], [61], [62], [63]), and
identity based public key cryptography (ID-PKG: [64], [65]). Here we discuss the
compatibility of those approaches with CCNs.
Smetters in [14] suggested the standard PKI approach for CCNs. In this ap-
proach, each node has a pair of keys (public key and private key) and for secure
communication, each node publishes its public key along with its certificate, as-
signed by a certification authority. Each node in the network verifies the public key
of other nodes by sending the attached certificate to the certification authority for
validation. The certification authority check the validity of the certificate and sends
the acknowledgement back to the node about the authenticity of the certificate.
Since PKI is based on the concept of a single centralized certification authority, it
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does not suit well the concept of CCNs, where contents are replicated in the network
and are requested and routed by name instead of being provided by a single source.
This increases the number of public/private key pairs, which in turn increases the
verification overhead for the single certification authority. ID-PKG completely elim-
inates the need for public key certificates by exploiting publicly known user identity
information (such as IP address or telephone number) as a public key for securing
information. ID-PKG enables any pair of users to communicate securely without
exchanging public key certificates, and without using the online services of a third
party. This is enabled by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG), which generates
the private keys of the entities using their public keys and a master secret key. In
2003, the first ID-PKG cryptography management and certification scheme [64] for
mobile ad hoc networks was presented by Khalili and Katz. The basic idea of the
scheme is similar to the scheme of Zhou and Haas [60]. A group of selected nodes
shares the responsibility of managing the PKG. Each node can obtain a system pri-
vate key share from a predefined minimum number of PKG manager nodes, which
collaborate with the node to generate the private key.
This scheme has several main problems. (1) These papers did not mention many
potential problems that can arise on the channel between PKG nodes and user nodes.
Consider for example the fact that a user’s private key could be easily wiretapped
by attackers. (2) The scheme does not mention how to identify the nodes that
manage the PKG and how to gain their private key when new nodes are added to
the network. (3) The scheme does not explain how to update the main key pair of
the system (including public and private key).
Hence in 2004, Deng proposed a new cryptography management and certification
scheme called ID-PKC [65]. In this scheme, there is a master public/private key pair.
The master public key is known by all nodes in the network, while the master private
key is divided into shares and distributed among k nodes of the network (fewer than
the total number of nodes). Each node ID is working as node public key and for
secure communication, it needs its private key. So the node sends a request to k
PKGs to get its private key share. The requesting node generates a temporary
public/private key pair and gives that public key to the PKGs to get its encrypted
private key share. After getting those shares, the node generate its private key.
Then the PKGs announce the requesting node ID to all nodes of the network, to be
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used as its public key. This scheme, however, still does not address the problem of
updating the main key of the system.
The system based on ID-PKC is a powerful alternative to PKI in terms of both
efficiency and convenience. However, it also has several problems, such as the key
escrow problem in case of PKGs compromission and suffers from a single point of
failure (as shown in [65]), because there is only one PKG responsible for generating
the private keys to the nodes. Although this second problem was solve by [64], the
key escrow problem still exists, because the private key of the PKG is compromised,
the entire system is compromised.
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Chapter 3
Key Pool Framework
Sensor networks consist of resource constrained devices in terms of storage space,
computational power, communication range and battery lifetime. It is not suitable
to adopt a key establishment and management approach that consume lot of these
resources (e.g. traditional key establishment and management approaches used for
the resource full computer networks). Keeping these constraints in mind, public
key cryptography, which is considered the most secure approach and very much
computational expensive, does not suit sensor networks. However, symmetric key
approach that does not involve any computation suits sensor networks constraints
but in case of large networks, it occupies lot of memory space of sensor nodes. To
overcome memory cost, key pool framework is considered as the best solution for the
key establishment and management in wireless sensor networks because it does not
contain any computations and occupy less memory than the standard symmetric
key approach. A number of key management solutions have been introduced for the
key pool framework to optimize the memory consumption of this approach. But
those solutions were proposed for the static networks. Hence, we considered the
mobility scenario and optimized memory cost of the key pool framework.
3.1 Network Model
The network model that we considered in our proposed scheme is based on the
model described in [68], in which all sensor nodes are divided into two categories
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i.e. Fixed sensor Nodes (FNs) and Mobile sensor Nodes (MNs) as shown in fig. 3.1.
The capabilities of FNs and MNs are different in terms of energy resources, memory,
computational power and transmission capabilities. MNs and FNs communicate di-
rectly if they both are in the communication range of each other. Moreover, MNs
can communicate with other MNs but the establishment of the communication key
is performed by a FN if it is present; otherwise, the MN establishes a temporarily
communication key until a FN becomes available. It is assumed that FNs are de-
ployed such that the MNs are considered as end devices of the network. But in real
deployment scenarios, this assumption could be not true.
FNs are expected to have additional radios (e.g. IEEE 802.11) and to be able to
communicate with the Base Station (BS), with other FNs and with the MNs within
their radio coverage area. If a MN is in the radio coverage range of more than one
FN, then the MN will select one of the FNs depending upon the best signal to noise
ratio, link quality, availability and bandwidth.
3.1.1 Cluster Formation
Figure 3.1 shows the cluster representation of the proposed network architecture.
For authentication purposes, the authentication key material is distributed to both
FNs and MNs. The proposed solution is based on an unbalanced key distribution
scheme compared to the adoption of a balanced approach.
In fact, using a balanced key distribution scheme [69], a large pool of size P of
secret keys is generated from which K keys are randomly selected for each sensor
node. Two nodes may establish a communication key if they have a common au-
thentication key. The probability that two nodes share at least one common key in
[69] is
P [Match] = 1− (P −K)!(P −K)!
P !(P − 2K)! (3.1)
But if the nodes do not have a key match, they can still establish a communica-
tion key through one or more intermediate nodes with whom they have a common
authentication key.
In this chapter, we propose an unbalanced approach for the authentication key
distribution and for this a key pool of size P is generated from which a key ring of
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Figure 3.1. Cluster Formation
size K is assigned to each MN and a key ring of size S to each FN, where S >> K
(Unbalanced Key distribution). The generation of key pool of size P is described
later. These keys are used for the authentication and for exchanging a communi-
cation key. MNs and FNs can authenticate each other using these keys if both are
within their radio range. Then the FN assigns a communication key to the MN for
secure communication. In case the MN is not able to communicate directly with
the FN then it establishes a path key with the FN through intermediate MNs. The
intermediate MNs can then authenticate this MN using its own FNs who assigned
them a communication key. For the authentication between the FN and the MN,
both must have at least one key in common: the relevant probability is given by
P [Match] = 1− (P −K)!(P − S)!
P !(P − S −K)! (3.2)
The probability of having at least one common key between the MNs is given by 5.1.
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In order to further improve secure authentication process and communication key
exchange and establishment phase, q shared key concept can be used as described
in [26]. And according to this, the probability that a MN and a FN containing key
rings of different sizes share exactly ’i’ keys is
p(i) =
(
P
i
)(
P−i
(S−i)+(K−i)
)(
(S−i)+(K−i)
S−i
)(
P
S
)(
P
K
) (3.3)
The probability that a MN and a FN share at least q keys used for the authentication
is
1−
q−1∑
i=0
p(i) (3.4)
3.2 Proposed Algorithm
A number of secure key management schemes exist in literature but here we propose
a new key management scheme that is more robust against node compromised at-
tack, has less memory overhead, and enhanced connectivity. After the keys distribu-
tion phase among the sensor nodes (i.e., MNs and FNs), we describe authentication,
connectivity and key establishment phase.
Notations that are used in this chapter:
SSC1 Secret communication key generation code-1
SSC2 Secret communication key generation code-2
m1 Key pool containing SSC1
m2 Key pool containing SSC2
P Authentication key pool size
S Authentication keys assigned to FNs
K Authentication keys assigned to MNs
Kplc Network public key
Kprt Network private key
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3.2.1 Key Distribution before Deployment
In our proposed scheme, we have a large key pool as in [69] and the BS selects
a random sub key pool of size P as an authentication key pool. After that, the
BS assigns a random key ring of size m1 and key ring of size m2 from a large
key pool to the FNs, where m1 = m2. These m1 and m2 key rings contain secret
communication key generation code SSC1 and secret communication key generation
code SSC2 respectively. Then the BS will transmit a random key ring of size S to
fixed sensor nodes and a key ring of size K to mobile sensor nodes selected from the
key pool P along with the key identifiers such that S >> K. FNs are also assigned
the authentication key identifier list which are assigned to the MNs. The numbers
of FNs are less compared to MNs and their position is fixed so that there is no need
to establish authentication key every time they communicate with the base station
(BS) or with other FNs. Thus FNs are assigned only public/private key pair for the
authentication and communication with the BS and other FNs. Each FN and the
BS knows the public keys of all the FNs. Thus the FNs are assigned three key pools
i.e., authentication key pool S, m1 and m2 along with the public keys of other FNs
and Kprt. This is because the FNs have more memory space compared to the MNs.
3.2.2 Authentication and Connectivity
After the network deployment, authentication is performed between the FN and
the MN. To this aim, the MN must have at least one common authentication key
with the FN or, in more secure authentication process, MN must shares at least
q common authentication keys with the FN for the direct authentication and the
probability of having at least one common key and q common keys are given by
5.2 and 5.4 respectively. Thus the MN sends a request including its ID encrypted
by Kplc to FN to ensure the global connectivity and FN decrypts it using Kprt and
responds with an authentication nonce encrypted by authentication key(s) of MN
along with the key identifier(s) as the FN has authentication keys information of
the MN.
In case of no key match or less key match from the given threshold as in case of
q-key authentication, the FN will authenticate MN through the base station as base
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Figure 3.2. Key Distribution
station have the full key map of all MNs. In fig. 3.3, we present the probability of
having at least one common authentication key between the FN and MN using 5.5
which is the simplified version of 5.2.
P [Match] = 1− (1−
K
P
)P−K+0.5 ∗ (1− S
P
)P−S+0.5
(1− K+S
P
)P−S−K+0.5
(3.5)
The MN may come into the radio range of more than one FN then the probability
of authentication of MN by the FN in network is given by
P [Authentication] = 1− (1− P [Match])a (3.6)
where ’a’ is the number of FN and P[Match] in 5.6 is defined by 5.5. Fig. 3.4
represents that the coverage of MN by more than one FN increases the authentication
probability of MN. However, the selection of the FN depends on the link quality,
availability and bandwidth and is done by the MN. As the MN uses the Kplc key for
the request to join or start the communication with the FN, the global connectivity
of the network is 100%. Also when the MN moves from the range of one FN to
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Figure 3.3. Probability of sharing at least one common authentication key
between the FN and MN
the other FN, it sends the previous FN identity to the new FN so that the new FN
communicates directly with the previous FN using his public key in order to reduce
the broadcast overhead about the incoming MN and the new FN authenticates
this MN using the previous method described above. If the new FN is not able
to authenticate this MN due to the insufficient number of common authentication
keys (compared to the given threshold) then it will authenticate this MN using the
previous FN. In case the previous FN also authenticates this MN through the BS
due to lack of authentication keys then it would not be able to authenticate this MN
for the new FN and new FN will authenticate it through BS. The authentication
among the FNs is done through the public/private key pairs. Each FN knows the
public keys of all other FNs and the BS.
3.2.3 Communication Key Establishment
When the MN is authenticated as a network authentic member then the FN creates
a communication key for that MN and sends it to the MN in the encrypted form
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Figure 3.4. Probability of authentication of MN with the range of more
than one FN with K=30
using q-authentication keys of the MN. When the FN does not have common keys
up to the given threshold q for the encryption then the FN asks the BS to generate
an encryption key for the encryption of communication key for the specific MN. The
BS generates encryption key and sends it to the FN along with the key identifiers
of the authentication keys of MN encrypted by the public key of the FN. The FN
uses that key for the encryption of communication key and informs the MN about
the key identifiers sent by the BS so that MN can generate a key for the decryption
of the message to get the communication key. The communication key is generated
using the key rings m1 and m2 and the total number of the key identifiers used
to generate the encryption key for the communication key. The generation of the
communication key is given by
Communication key = SSCq1 mod SSC2 (3.7)
Here q is the total number of the key identifiers. For example, SSC1=25325687,
SSC2=54136752 and q=2, then communication key=01437025.
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3.3 Analysis and Evaluation
3.3.1 Memory Cost
Let the key rings m1 and m2 be composed of 100 keys. These two key rings are
independent from each other. The total possible number of communication keys
generated by these two key rings is 10,000. If we compare our proposed scheme with
the previous scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [51], instead of storing
10,000 keys in a sensor node, only 200 keys are required to get 10,000 communication
key combinations. This reduces the memory cost of the node while maintains the
same security level. The reply attack is avoided by using the time stamps and
hash function. MN includes the hash of time stamp in the message encrypted by
Kplc which is further encrypted by the communication key. Upon the reception of
message, FN checks the time stamp: if it is valid, message is accepted. In this way
the message freshness is assured and reply attack is avoided. Each FN also sends
the node IDs of all the MNs to the BS with whom it is communicating. By doing
this, the BS would be able to keep the track of each MN in the network and it helps
against the node replication attack.
3.3.2 Resilience Against Node Capture Attack
Node compromised attacks are possible on FNs and on the MNs. But in this paper,
we deal with only the MN compromised attack. As the MNs are assumed to be the
end devices, most of the time they communicate with the FN and a communica-
tion key is assigned to MN by FN. To ensure the reliability and availability of the
network in the case when FN is out of reach from the MNs then they can establish
a direct communication link with other MNs or with the FN through intermediate
MNs using its authentication key pool. Thus the MNs plays an important role in
the network communication and connectivity. First, we present the probability of
establishing a communication link between the two MNs and it is only possible when
these two MNs have a common authentication key. The results are shown in the fig.
3.5, which are achieved by varying the size of the key pool P for each different key
pool size of MN. This shows that lower the size of K compared to P, lower is the
probability of establishing a communication link between the two MNs. Thus if one
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Figure 3.5. The probability of establishing a communication link of one MN with
the other MN by varying the size of authentication key pools ’P’ and ’K’
of them is a compromised node, then the probability of establishing a compromised
communication link with other MNs is much smaller which also reduces the prob-
ability for the uncompromised MNs to establishing a compromised link with the
FN through this intermediate compromised MN. The probability of the fraction of
communication compromised by compromising more than one i.e., n MNs is given
by
P [Compromised] = 1−
(
1− K
P
)n
(3.8)
where K is the number of keys stored in the MN and P is key pool size from which
K is randomly selected for each MN. Fig. 3.6 show the result of node compromised
attack of our proposed scheme compared with the basic scheme in [51] and NPKPS
scheme in [31]. This graph shows that our scheme substantially lowers the fraction
of compromised communication after n nodes are compromised. The main reason
for this improvement is that, in our scheme, we store less number of keys (that
introduce the possibility to compromise communication links) in MN compared to
the basic scheme.
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On-line Key Generation
Framework for Wireless Sensor
Networks
Chapter 4
Online Key Generation Approach
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) technology is being increasingly adopted in a wide
variety of applications ranging from home/building and industrial automation to
more safety critical applications including e-health or infrastructure monitoring.
This increases the networks size in terms of total number of sensor nodes deployed
in the networks. This increase in sensor nodes makes the use of key pool framework
approach a challenging task because of the network connectivity in terms of com-
mon shared key and node compromission attacks. These issues force researchers to
find an alternative solutions. Hence the on-line key generation approach using the
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [45] is considered a best solution which is less
computationally expensive and provides the same level of security with a shorter
key length than the standard PKI approach. We also adopt the on-line key gener-
ation approach to reduce the memory cost and keep the communication overhead
low during the authentication and key establishment phase.
4.1 Proposed Algorithm
In this Chapter, the proposed key establishment scheme for HSNs is presented. The
reference network model defines a HSN composed of a Base Station (BS), Fixed
Nodes (FNs) and Mobile Nodes (MNs). These nodes are heterogeneous in terms of
computational power, memory and energy resources. However, the same communi-
cation technology is adopted. The BS and the FNs are powerful devices while MNs
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are characterized by very limited resources and can change their position within the
given environment following a specific mobility model. Moreover, the MNs are more
numerous than the FNs, and only the FNs need to be equipped with tamper-resistant
hardware.
In this resulting scenario, the BS only communicates with the FNs and acts as a
trusted server for them. To address scalability issues, a cluster-based approach has
been adopted (similarly as in [20]). In fact, FNs act as Cluster Heads (CHs) and are
in charge of managing authentication and key establishment operations for a group
of MNs.
4.1.1 Overview of Proposed Algorithm
Node authentication and key establishment are the basic security features provided
by the proposed solution. First the authentication phase is performed among the
FNs and the MNs. Once the authentication phase is successfully completed, key
establishment operations can be performed among the MNs and FNs. The pro-
posed scheme supports mobility by providing the two considered functionalities in
a scenario where MNs move from one cluster to another one. Fig. 4.1 depicts the
main operations of the proposed scheme for the HSNs.
4.1.2 Key Pre-Distribution
In this section, key pre-distribution among the FNs and the MNs is described. A
secret key (SK) is assigned to every MN; more specifically, such key is generated
using a Secret Key Generator (SKG), a prime number that is pre-assigned to each
MN of the network (MNPN), and the two randomly generated prime numbers (using
MNPN and SKG as a seed to the prime number generator) using a one way secret
key generation function f( ). The key establishment procedure is discussed in section
4.1.5.
Each FN is provided with the following key material: the public key of the BS,
its own public/private key pair, a one-way authentication key generation function
g(), a Secret Key Generator (SKG) and a one way secret key generation function f(
), a Compromised Node Detection Key (CNDK) and a network private key (Kprt)
along with its own prime. It is worth noting that FNs must also implement a fast
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Figure 4.1. Overview of proposed algorithm
key revocation algorithm in order to protect the Secret Key Generator (SKG) and
the network private key.
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As far as the MNs are concerned, the following key material is considered: a
secret key (SK), a network public key Kplc, an authentication key Kauth, the Fixed
Node Prime Number Sum (FNPNS), its own prime number and a random number.
4.1.3 Cluster Formation
Once the network is deployed, FNs start the cluster formation phase. During the
cluster formation phase, all the FNs periodically broadcast a Hello messages to
neighboring MNs for a given number of times (3-times in the proposed scheme).
Such messages include nodes IDs and a random nonce encrypted using the network
private key. It is assumed that the FNs are deployed such that most MNs receive
Hello messages from more than one FN. The selection of FN as a CH depends on
the Hello message signal strength. Each MN also keeps a list of neighboring FNs
from which it has received Hello messages to possibly identify backup CHs. If, for
some reason, the MNs do not receive any FN Hello message within a given time
period, they start broadcasting Hello message including a nonce encrypted by the
network public key to discover authentic neighboring FNs. Fig. 4.2 describes the
virtual network organization.
4.1.4 Mobile Nodes Authentication
To get access to the network, each MN needs to authenticate itself with a selected
CH. To do so, the MN sends a ”Join request” encrypted using the network public key.
The request includes the Fixed Node Prime Number Sum, a random number related
to its authentication key and the nonce provided within the Hello Message sent by
the selected CH along with its own prime number encrypted by MN’s authentication
key. Once received such information, the CH is able to infer the authentication key
of the MN by using one-way authentication key generation function g() as follows
KAuth = g(FNPNS, Random Number, SKG) (4.1)
Successful decryption of the encrypted nonce and MN prime number by the CH
using the inferred Kauth proves the MN authenticity. It is worth noting that the
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use of SKG in Kauth gener ti n guarante s that an au hentic FN is actually gener-
ating the Kauth and that MN prime number is not revealed to any adversary node.
After the authenticity check, the FN sends the joining confirmation and a Network
Authentication Code (NAC) to the MN. This is used to reduce the authentication
burden whil he MN moves thr ugh different clusters within the same n twork.
The Network Authentication Code is also periodically updated as a countermeasure
to replay attacks or node replication attacks performed by an adversary.
4.1.5 Key Establishment and Management
To secure communication between the CH and the MN, each MN is assigned a secret
key SK while its generation function is assigned to the FNs before the deployment.
During the authentication phase, each CH receives the MN prime numbers of its
member MNs. CHs using these MN prime numbers and the secret key generator
SKG generate the first prime number using prime number generator (PN1); this
prime number is further combined with the MN prime numbers and secret key
generator SKG to generate the second prime number (PN2). Then, the CH generates
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Figure 4.3. Authentication and Key Establishment Phase
the required secret key using a one way secret key generation function f( ), thus
obtaining the same secret key owned by the specific MN
Secret Key = f(PN1, PN2, MNPN, SKG) (4.2)
For secure communication between the MNs, a secret key between them is generated
by the CH. For instance, if a mobile node A wants to establish a direct communica-
tion link with mobile node B, it sends its IDA along with the IDB to its CH. Then
the CH generates a secret key for them using their IDs, prime numbers and one way
secret key generation function f( ) and sends it to both MNs using the secret key
shared with each of them. CHs also periodically inform the BS about their member
MNs to avoid the node replication attacks in the network.
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4.1.6 Handover
During the movement of a MN to perform its task, it may move from one cluster
to another cluster in the network. To provide full connectivity to MNs, FNs are
deployed such that each MN should normally receive Hello messages from more
than one FN. One of the FNs is selected as a CH by the MN based on the Hello
message received signal strength, while information about other neighboring FNs is
kept as a backup. A MN moves from one cluster to another cluster if it finds its CH
signal strength dropped below a certain threshold during its periodic check. Before
the transition to the new cluster, a MN sends broadcast Hello messages to discover
new neighbors and update the relevant list. Once the CH is selected base on the
signal strength of the Hello message response, the MN sends to the old CH a leaving
message also including the new CH ID and sends a join request containing the
Network Authentication Code to the new CH. After the verification of the Network
Authentication Code, the new CH contacts the old CH of the MN asking for its
prime number. If the old CH received the leaving message from its MN including
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the new CH ID, it confirms the MN movement to the new CH by sending the MN
prime number and also informs the BS to avoid node replication attacks. After
receiving the MN prime number, the new CH accepts the joining request from the
incoming MN. If, due to e.g., poor radio coverage or packet losses, the MN leaving
message is not received by its previous CH and its joining request is received by the
new CH, then upon the reception of the MN prime number request from the new
CH about its MN, the previous CH tries to contact its MN to confirm the transition.
If it receives a positive response from its MN or no response, it sends the MN prime
number to the new CH and also informs the BS that the specific MN is moving to
another CH. After receiving the MN prime number, the new CH generates the secret
key SK of this MN and informs the BS about new MN ID. The old CH deletes this
MN from its MN members list and the BS updates the MN members lists related
to the other CHs in order to avoid node replication attacks.
4.1.7 Addition of New Mobile Nodes
MNs are unreliable devices with limited power supply; hence they may fail or run
out of power over time. This can cause coverage and connectivity problems in
WSNs, significantly degrade network performance and shorten network lifetime. To
overcome these problems, some MNs could be replaced and new MNs would be
added in the network. However, adding new MNs poses new challenges for security
schemes such as the establishment of security keys with the existing FNs and MNs;
in fact, newly deployed MNs could be compromised or could be malicious nodes.
In the proposed scheme, a newly deployed MN is pre-loaded with a special au-
thentication code along with the authentication key. The BS is in charge of inform-
ing the FNs about the addition of the new MN, also providing the relevant ID and
a special authentication code. The purpose of this special authentication code is
to avoid the Sybil attacks in which an adversary can create multiple copies of the
compromised MN with new IDs and introduce them as new nodes in the network.
The newly added MN broadcasts a Hello message encrypted using the network
public key to discover its neighboring authentic FNs. This Hello message includes
the MN ID and special authentication code. Upon the reception of Hello message
from the new MN, neighboring FNs will check the special authentication code by
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comparing it with the BS-provided code. After successful verification, FNs send their
cluster identities and authentication nonce encrypted using the network private key.
After receiving the response from the neighboring FNs, the MN will select one of
the authentic FNs having the best signal to noise ratio as its CH and will send a
joining request to establish a secret key and get the Network Authentication Code
from its CH.
4.2 Performance Analysis
In this section, the proposed scheme is analyzed using the OMNET++ simulator,
in terms of network connectivity, network resilience against node capture attacks,
energy consumption, memory cost and communication overhead. The simulation re-
sults have been obtained using OMNET++ 4.1 with the mobility framework MiXiM
2.0.1. The simulation scenario is defined by a network composed of 500 MNs and
16 FNs. The size of the network simulation area is 400m x 400m. Both the FNs
and the MNs use the 802.15.4 CSMA and radio specification based on the CC2420
radio chip. The transmission power is set to 10mW and sensitivity is set to -95dBm
for all nodes. The mobility of the MNs is described by the random walk mobility
model in which the speed of the MNs is constant but a random direction is chosen
periodically within a predefined range. More specifically, the speed of the MNs is set
to 1m/s and their direction update interval to 0.1s. The simulations were repeated
3 times for 5000 seconds for each result.
Result comparison of the proposed solution with other existing key management
protocols shows better network connectivity and resilience, with a significant reduc-
tion in memory and communication overhead.
4.2.1 Network Connectivity
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed solution in terms of network
connectivity, the simulation results of the proposed scheme are compared with [51],
[37], [38] and [39] where the connectivity depends on the key sharing probability. For
a balanced key pre-distribution scheme, the single key sharing probability between
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the MN and the FN is given by
Pr[Connectivity] = 1− (P −K)!(P −K)!
P !(P − 2K)! (4.3)
where K is the number of keys assigned to FNs and MNs from a pool of P keys.
Instead, for the unbalanced key pre-distribution [37], [38] schemes, the single key
sharing probability is given by
Pr[Connectivity] = 1− (P −K)!(P − S)!
P !(P − S −K)! (4.4)
where K is the size of the key pool assigned to each MN and S (S >> K) is the size
of the key pool assigned to each FN.
In the proposed scheme, the Kplc is assigned to each MN and the Kprt to each FN
before network deployment. These two keys connect a MN to an authentic FN of
the network. Hence the connectivity of the network is almost 100% if and only if the
FN is not compromised. Fig. 4.5 shows the comparison of OMNET++ simulation
results for the network connectivity of the proposed scheme with [51], [37], [38] and
[39].
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4.2.2 Memory Cost
This section presents the comparison of memory overhead of the proposed scheme
with some well known existing key management schemes for HSNs.
In an ECC-based key management scheme [58], the total memory overhead is
(nMN + 3) ∗ nFN + 2nMN , where nMN and nFN are the numbers of MNs and FNs
respectively [20]. Instead, in the solution presented by Yang et al. [59], each FN
is preloaded with a pair of public/private keys and nFN − 1 distinct pairwise keys,
while no key is pre-loaded in the MNs. The memory overhead of this scheme is
(2 +nFN − 1) ∗nFN . According to the basic scheme [51], each node is loaded with q
keys before deployment, thus resulting in a total memory overhead of q∗(nFN+nMN).
In the scheme proposed in this paper, each MN is loaded with only 3 keys (i.e.,
SK, Kplc and Authentication Key) and each FN is loaded with 6 keys (i.e., the BS
public key, its own public/private key pair, SKG, CNDK and Kprt). The resulting
memory overhead is 6nFN + 3nMN .
To analyze and compare the proposed scheme with the existing schemes [58],
[51], [37], [59], [38], it is assumed that each FN is able to make a maximum of d
connections with its neighboring MNs. According to [51], [37] and [38], if a node
has Nc neighbors and that node has to establish secure links with only d neighbors,
then the required key sharing probability should be
Pr =
d
Nc
(4.5)
For example, the single key sharing probability required to make 30 connections
with the neighboring MNs out of 38 neighbors is approximately 0.80. From fig. 4.5,
each node in [51] should carry 400 keys and each FN in [37] should carry 700 keys
while each MN should carry 228 keys while in [38] each FN should carry 250 keys
and each MN should carry 30 keys. In our scheme, each FN should be loaded with
only 6 secret keys.
Fig. 4.6 summarizes the performance offered by different solutions in terms of
the total number of the keys deployed for different sizes of the WSN. The results
show that the proposed scheme requires fewer keys compared to other approaches.
For less dense networks, the proposed scheme and Yang’s scheme require almost
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the same number of keys. However, the proposed scheme performs better in dense
networks.
 
 
 
 
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
x 10
6
Total Number of Nodes in the Network
M
em
or
y 
O
ve
rh
ea
d
 
 
Basic Scheme
ECC-Scheme
Yang scheme
Proposed Online Key Generation Scheme
X. Du Scheme
Proposed Key Pool Approach
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1 2 3 4 5
Basic (E.G.) Scheme
Proposed Online Key Generation Scheme
Zhang Scheme
X. Du Scheme
Number of Compromised FNs
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
Co
m
pr
om
is
ed
Figure 4.6. Comparison of memory overhead produce by the proposed scheme
with some existing scheme
4.2.3 Network Resilience to Node Capturing Attacks
This section shows the effect of node compromised attacks on data communication
capabilities. In the proposed scheme, FNs and MNs are provided with different
security measures dealing with such attacks. Since FNs act as both CHs and data
sinks for MNs, they are provided with tamper resistant hardware to protect their
security material. Once the FN is captured, all security keys are replaced by a
reference ”compromised key” which does not allow the node to authenticate itself
to the BS nor to accept any joining MN. On the contrary, MNs are not provided
with the tamper resistant hardware. Node compromised attack in case of balanced
and unbalanced key pre-distribution schemes for homogeneous and heterogeneous
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sensor networks have a significant impact on the security offered by the communi-
cation links operating within the network due to the large number of shared keys
with other nodes in the network. The fraction of communications compromised by
compromising n MNs in shared key pre-distribution schemes is given by
Pr[Compromised] = 1−
(
1− K
P
)n
(4.6)
where K is the number of keys assigned to each MN from a pool of P keys. In case
of compromised FNs, K is replaced by S in (6). Fig. 4.7 shows the OMNET++
simulation results about how many communications links a compromised MN can
create with uncompromised MNs without involving the CH/FN. More specifically,
the figure compares the proposed scheme with the schemes proposed in [51], [37], [38]
and [32] with Pr[Conn]=0.8. The proposed scheme performs better because (i) a MN
cannot establish directly a communication link with the other MNs of the network
and (ii) all the FNs use the algorithm proposed in [23] to detect the compromised
MNs. Since the FNs act as trusted servers to the MNs, their compromission can
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severely affect the network security. Fig. 4.8 shows a comparison of the OMNET++
simulation results for the FNs compromission of the proposed scheme with [51], [37],
and [32]. It is clear from fig. 4.8 that FN compromission results in almost the same
number of compromised links when using [51] and [37]. Although [32] proposed a
balanced key distribution for the HSNs like [51] for homogeneous sensor networks, it
performs better than [51] and [37] because it divides the key pool P into a number of
groups equal to the number of clusters thus increasing not only network connectivity
but also network resilience against both FN and MN capture attacks.
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4.2.4 Communication Overhead
In this section, the communication overhead is evaluated also analyzing the different
contributions from authentication and key establishment phases. The simulation
scenario is modified in order to include 16 FNs and 500 MNs.
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4.2.4.1 Authentication Overhead
Concerning the authentication overhead, the total number of packets exchanged
during the authentication phase is considered. The authentication phase of the
proposed solution is compared with some of the existing approaches [32], [33] and
[20]. OMNET++ simulation results show that the proposed scheme produces less
authentication overhead than the existing schemes, as shown in fig. 4.9.
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Figure 4.9. Authentication overhead comparison
4.2.4.2 Key Establishment Overhead
The proposed solution is also compared with the basic homogeneous [51] and hetero-
geneous [37], [20] schemes. The results show a significant reduction of the communi-
cation overhead. A 99% network connectivity probability for [51] and [37] was taken
into account, computing the number of keys required in each FN and MN (using the
results of (3) and (4)). The obtained results are shown in fig. 4.10. There is only a
slight difference in terms of communication overhead between the homogeneous and
heterogeneous approach, but there is a big difference in terms of memory cost (fig.
4.6).
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Figure 4.10. Average number of key messages exchanged during the first
key establishment phase
4.2.4.3 Total Initialization phase Overhead
This section presents the OMNET++ simulation results for the total communication
overhead generated during the first authentication and key establishment phase.
The results of the proposed scheme have been compared with the ones related to
[32] and [20], since both solutions are based on the mutual authentication and key
establishment phases. Fig. 4.11 represents the resulting communication overhead
by varying the size of the network.
4.2.5 Energy Consumption
This section describes the average energy consumption of each node during the
authentication and initialization phases of the network (again using the OMNET++
simulator). The proposed solution requires only 2 messages for the authentications
as shown in fig. 4.9 compared to [33] which requires 4 messages and with [32] and
[20] which require 3 messages for authentication. The average energy consumption
of each node during the authentication phase in the proposed scheme compared
with [33], [32] and [20] is shown in fig 4.12. Fig. 4.11 also shows the effectiveness
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Figure 4.11. Total communication overhead in the network during the
initialization phase
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Figure 4.12. Total communication overhead in the network during the
initialization phase
of combining the authentication and key establishment phases to reduce the total
overhead during the initialization phase. Such optimization results in power savings
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at each node and in an overall increase of the network life time. Fig. 4.13 represents
the OMNET++ results for the average energy consumption of each node during the
initialization phase (authentication and key establishment) in the proposed scheme,
as compared with [33] and [20]. The results show that the proposed solution of
combining the authentication and key establishment messages reduces the energy
consumption with respect to [33], [20] where separate messages are exchanged for
key establishment between the nodes after their successful authentication.
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Figure 4.13. Total communication overhead in the network during the
initialization phase
4.3 Security Analysis and Evaluation against At-
tacks
Since cryptography is considered as the main building block of any security primi-
tive, the cryptographic keys should also be secured and authentic. To this aim, the
key management scheme should be secure and each node of the network should be
able to authenticate the cryptographic key(s). This is the most challenging prob-
lem in such resource constrained networks. In order to validate the secrecy of the
proposed key management scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks, we used the
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications)
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tool [67]. AVISPA is a push-button tool for the automated validation of Internet
security-sensitive protocols and applications. It provides a modular and expressive
formal language for specifying protocols and their security properties, and integrates
different back-ends that implement a variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis
techniques (e.g. OFMC, ATSE, etc). We implemented the proposed key manage-
ment scheme in AVISPA and checked its security using some of the attacks provided
by AVISPA, namely OFMC (On-the-Fly Model-Checker) and CL-AtSe (Constraint-
Logic-based Attack Searcher). The former builds the infinite tree defined by the pro-
tocol analysis problem in a demand-driven way, i.e. on-the-fly and uses a number of
symbolic techniques to represent the state-space. The latter provides a translation
from any security protocol specification written as a transition relation into a set of
constraints which can be effectively used to find attacks on protocols.
Technique Summary
OFMC SAFE
CL-AtSe SAFE
Table 4.1. AVISPA Simulation Results
Both translation and checking are fully automatic and internally performed by
CL-AtSe, i.e. no external tool is used. In this approach, each protocol step is
modelled by constraints on the adversary knowledge. These results are shown in
table 4.1. We evaluated the proposed scheme against some well known attacks DoS
attacks, Node Replication attacks, Wormhole attacks, Black-hole attacks and Sybil
attacks and showed how the proposed scheme performs in such attacking scenarios.
We evaluate the proposed scheme against.
4.3.1 Denial of Service Attacks
The Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are used to degrade the performance of a net-
work by exhausting its resources, such as bandwidth, memory or processor time
or by sending fake network topology and routing information. The possible DoS
attacks in the proposed scheme might be during (1) the cluster formation phase (2)
the MN transition phase from one cluster to another (3) the addition of new nodes
in the network.
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During the cluster formation phase, all FNs periodically broadcast Hello mes-
sages for a specific number of times (3-times in the proposed scheme) and each Hello
message is encrypted by the network private key. If an intruder broadcasts its own
Hello messages, those messages will not be decrypted by the network public key and
would be discarded by the MNs of the network. Also the MNs check how many
hello messages they received from a specific FN. If those messages are above a pre-
defined threshold, the MNs consider that FN as a adversary or malicious node of the
network. We implemented the DoS attack in the OMNET++ simulator to check
the performance of the proposed scheme against the replay attack of the FNs Hello
messages by introducing a different number of attacking nodes. In the evaluated
DoS attack, the attacker captures the Hello messages of the FNs and forwards it
to the MNs by changing the source node ID in the packet. We analyze how many
MNs the attacker can isolate from the network by forwarding the captured Hello
messages before the MNs receive a Hello from the authentic FNs. Table 4.2 shows
the results of the simulation with 200 MNs and 16 FNs and different number of
attacking nodes.
Total number of
attacking nodes
Total Hello messages
sent by the attacker
Total MNs receive
Hello messages from
attacker
1 25 10
2 110 13
3 132 20
Table 4.2. DoS attack evaluation
Note that a total isolation of the MNs from the network by sending the captured
and modified Hello message is not possible, because if the MNs send a response to
the attacking node, the attacker would not be able to decrypt it and then the MNs
would start to broadcast their own Hello messages to know about their neighboring
FNs to join the network.
During the MNs transition from one cluster to another cluster, each MN broad-
casts Hello messages to know about its neighboring FNs. Since, in the proposed
scheme, these Hello messages also include the NAC (Network Authentication Code)
which is used by the FNs of the network to authenticate the incoming MN, the
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adversary would not be able to send the correct NAC to the FNs and would be de-
tected at its first broadcast. The adversary can also add a fake node in the network,
to try to get access to the network by broadcasting a Hello message to know about
its neighboring FNs. But since in the proposed scheme the BS informs the FNs
about the addition of a new MN, its ID and a specific authentication code assigned
to that MN, the adversary fake node would not be able to authenticate itself to
the FNs and would be detected at its first broadcast. Thus the proposed scheme
effectively avoids these three different types of DoS attacks that could be launched
by an adversary at any stage of the network and could exhaust the resources of both
the FNs and the MNs.
4.3.2 Node Replication Attacks
The MNs are more vulnerable than the FNs and can be easily captured, analyzed
and replicated by the attacker in various positions of the network. Such attacks may
allow the adversary to corrupt data and may disconnect a significant part of the net-
work. Node replication attack might be possible (1) during the network initialization
phase and (2) after the network initialization phase. However node replication in
the network initialization phase is difficult for an attacker because of the secure
deployment phase. The attacker can launch the node replication attack after the
network initialization phase when the network will no longer be under observation by
the network deployer. Since in the proposed scheme the MNs communicate directly
with their selected FNs/CHs, each FN sends its member MN IDs to the BS after
the initialization phase. Also, during the transition phase of a MN from one cluster
to another cluster, the new CH verifies the transition of the incoming MN from its
previous CH. Thus node replication in the network is immediately detected by the
BS during the initialization phase or by the FNs during the handover phase of the
MNs. Thus the proposed scheme avoids node replication attacks in the network.
4.3.3 Wormhole Attacks
In the wormhole attack, an adversary launches two nodes in two different clusters,
connecting them using a direct communication link called wormhole link. This link
could be an Ethernet cable, long range wireless transmission, or an optical link. The
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main purpose of this attack is to capture the traffic of one part of the network and
replay it in the other part of the network. Also this attack is easily implemented
in multi hop networks. This attack can be launched against the proposed scheme
during the initialization phase by replaying the Hello messages of one part of the FNs
of the network into another part of the network, to attract the MN communications.
However in this type of attack, the attacker acts as a man-in-the-middle and just
forward the packets from one part of the network to the other but would not be
able to understand or extract the key/data information from the received packets.
The verification of this man-in-the-middle attack was performed using the AVISPA
tool which verified the security of the proposed scheme as shown in table 4.1. Note
that we use a single hop network topology approach in which each MN is only one
hop away from the FNs. The FNs send their member MN lists to the BS and the
BS knows the location and position of each cluster of the network, so this wormhole
attack, if launched after the network initialization phase, can be easily detected and
avoided in the network by the BS. The adversary node in one cluster cannot pretend
to be a member node of another cluster ( even of neighboring cluster) despite having
updated information received by the BS from the FNs.
4.3.4 Sybil Attacks
In the Sybil attack, a malicious/attacker node assumes multiple identities to launch
attacks against storage space of its neighboring node or some protocol specific at-
tacks (e.g., routing algorithms). This attack is reactively successful against key
predistribution mechanisms, but since the proposed scheme uses an online authen-
tication key and secret key generation technique which involves the node ID and its
unique prime number, it makes it difficult for an attacker to launch sybil attack.
For example, in other key predistribution approaches, if an attacker compromises a
few nodes and obtains a few authentic keys of the network, it can launch sybil nodes
with different IDs and can assign them those compromised keys. Now when the ver-
ification and authentication process starts for some authentic nodes of the network,
the sybil nodes can give them a proof of authenticity by sending their own key pool
IDs along with the compromised key IDs. If the verifier node and the sybil node
have a common key among their key pool (i.e. the key ID and the actual key are
76
4 – Online Key Generation Approach
the same), the verifier node would not be able to detect the sybil node. Otherwise
if the key IDs match but the keys do not match, then the verifier node can detect
such sybil nodes in the verification process. But in the proposed scheme there is
no concept of initial secret key predistribution and all the predistributed keys are
the funtion of the node IDs and their assigned secret prime number. Hence node
compromission does not help the attacker to launch sybil nodes with fake IDs.
In the key pre-distribution approach [75], if every node is assigned ’k’ keys from a
key pool of size ’m’ and ’d’ verifiers are used to verify a node, and if an attacker com-
promises ’c’ nodes to create a compromised key pool of size ’n’, then the probability
of a sybil node to be successful is
Probability(Successful Sybil Nodes) =
k∑
t=1
(
n
t
)(
m−n
k−t
)(
m
k
) ((m−k+tk )(
m
k
) )d (4.7)
Fig. 4.14 compares the key pre-distribution approaches with the proposed online
key generation approach based on some pre-distributed key materials. The proposed
solution shows better results because of the key generation algorithms assigned to
the FNs and the establishment of keys between the MNs through their FNs/CHs.
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In the key pre-distribution approach [34], if every node is assigned ‘k’ keys from a key pool 
of size ‘m’ a d ‘d’ verifiers are used to verify a node, and if an attacker compromises ‘c’ 
nodes to create a compromised key pool of size ‘n’, then the probability of a sybil node to be 
successful is 
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Fig. 9 compares the key pre-distribution approaches with the proposed online key generation 
approach based on some pre-distributed key materials. The proposed solution shows better 
results because of the key generation algorithms assigned to the FNs and the establishment of 
keys between the MNs through heir FNs/CHs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Probability of successfully generated sybil nodes 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14. Probability of successfully generated sybil nodes
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Chapter 5
Key Generation for IP-Based
Wireless Sensor Networks
(6LoWPAN)
Integration between wireless sensor networks and traditional IP networks using the
IPv6 and 6LoWPAN standards is a very active research and application area. A
combination of hybrid network significantly increases the complexity of addressing
connectivity and fault tolerance problems in a highly heterogeneous environment,
including for example different packet sizes in different networks. In such chal-
lenging conditions, securing the communication between nodes with very diverse
computational, memory and energy storage resources is at the same time an essen-
tial requirement and a very complex issue. In this chapter we present an efficient
and secure mutual authentication and key establishment protocol based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) by which different classes of nodes, with very differ-
ent capabilities, can authenticate each other and establish a secret key for secure
communication. The analysis of the proposed scheme shows that it provides good
network connectivity and resilience against some well known attacks.
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5.1 Overview
Recent research activities in the field of LoWPANs aim to integrate sensors and
actuators into traditional IP networks using IPv6 over LoWPAN (6LoWPAN)[70].
Smart objects belonging to a 6LoWPAN can directly communicate with an IPv6
host, thus allowing data processing operations to be performed in standard servers.
6LoWPAN actually enables the integration of smart objects into the overall Internet,
toward the definition of the Internet of Things (IoT). In such resulting scenario, the
presence of billions of objects raises additional issues in terms of scalability, man-
ageability, addressing, security, privacy, secure mobility and robustness. Therefore
an efficient redesign of the Internet architecture and the definition of new proto-
cols are required to cope with the above challenges in the future Internet. In fact,
several projects from industrial and international collaboration are being carried
out to define the future internet architecture which would solve the limitations of
the current architecture [71] including security, mobility and interoperability for the
heterogeneity of networks.
In this context, mobility support for small and smart devices is one of the main
important issues since it is utilized for realizing many innovative applications. Mo-
bile communication may increase fault tolerance capabilities of a network but it
requires continuous connectivity among the nodes in the network or in its clusters
and could also introduce new threats against the privacy, integrity and confidential-
ity. Here, we specifically focus on authentication and on securing the communication
between nodes in the real deployment of 6LoWPANs.
A number of cryptographic mechanisms have been introduced in the literature
for secure authentication and encryption in WSNs such as block ciphers as part of
standards-based protocols, including IEEE 802.15.4, different variants of symmetric
and asymmetric cryptography. While these mechanisms are optimized to suit the
resource constrained sensor and actuator networks, in case of 6LoWPAN networks,
where the networks are integrated into the internet, such cryptographic mechanisms
can still experience poor performance due to the size of the packets exchanged and
the length of the keys. Furthermore, it is difficult to distribute the security keys in
the federated combination of networks. Thus these mechanisms need to be modified
to suite the resulting IoT scenario.
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Raza in [72] represented a secure End-to-End (E2E) communication protocol
between the IP enabled sensor networks and the traditional internet using the com-
pressed and light weight design implementation of IPSec. Their performance evalu-
ation in terms of code size, packet overhead, and communication performance shows
that their proposed scheme has a comparable overhead to the generally deployed
802.15.4 link layer security while it offers a true E2E security. Jara in [70],[73]
proposed a secure mobility management scheme for the 6LoWPAN based on the
ID/Locator split architecture and on the extension of the Return Routability with
Diffie-Hellman key agreement and ECC. Their proposed solutions deal efficiently
with the DoS attacks and flooding attacks against the ID/location update messages,
home registration and binding transfer process. They also verified and evaluated the
schemes successfully with the AVISPA tool.
5.2 Proposed Algorithm
Here we describe the proposed authentication and key establishment phases for IP-
enabled wireless sensor and actuator networks based on 6LoWPAN. Since the total
number of hosts in a network could vary a lot and and the network might also
contain thousands of nodes, the use of key pre-distribution techniques could not
represent the most proper solution. In fact, such mechanisms require large memory
space that could be not available in resource constrained smart objects. In addition,
the nodes are expected to move and may leave their current network and enter into
a foreign network.
Therefore, we introduce a new approach based on the Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy (ECC) that supports a higher security level compared to the standard encryp-
tion techniques (RSA, AES), while using shorter key length and introducing less
computational overhead. In this approach, the joining network easily authenticates
the incoming node by generating its authentication key instead of getting the node’s
authentication key from node’s previous network in order to reduce the total com-
munication overhead during the authentication of the incoming mobile node, also
avoiding the introduction of new vulnerabilities.
The reference network model considers two sub networks connected with each
other through edge routers as shown in fig. 5.1. In addition, a specific node in the
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network acts a reference for the different supported security functionalities and it is
called Network Security Manager.
Figure 5.1. Virtual Network Architecture
5.2.1 Offline Key Assignment
Important key materials are assigned offline to each node and are used to authenti-
cate each other by generating the authentication key and to secure the communica-
tion link by generating a public/private key pair for encryption and decryption of
the messages. More specifically:
 To each entity of the network a random number is assigned by the Network
Security Manager after a node registration phase
 To each entity of the network one share of the public key is also assigned,
while the other share of the public key would be generated by the relevant
local Network Security Manager
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 When considering the secure communication between two nodes in the net-
work, source IP and destination IP are used to generate a specific elliptic curve
(adopted just for the pair of nodes taken into account)
 Each entity and a network has its own generator Ge and Gn respectively
5.2.2 Authentication
Authentication is an important and initial step in the network security that allows a
trusted node to access the network resources and establishes secure links with other
nodes of the network while it prevents an adversary to gain access to those resources
and exploit possible vulnerabilities. Here, we describe how two nodes belonging to
different networks can authenticate with each other.
Due to large number of entities (smart objects and IP hosts) in the network, it
would not be a feasible solution to provide an authentication key(s) to an entity
especially when it belongs to a resource constrained network (i.e. sensor network).
In fact, (1) nodes usually have limited memory space and cannot store a large
number of keys for secure communication with a very large number of entities of
all networks (2) nodes are inherently prone to security attacks e.g., sensor nodes
can easily be captured and their stored keys reused (3) partial distribution of keys
reduces the network connectivity in the considered federated large networks. Hence
we use an online key generation approach based on the ECC to reduce the memory
consumption and avoid the key revocation/renewal in case of node capturing attack.
Every node is provided with a prime number ’p’ that would be used to generate
the private key for a particular destination node. It is worth stressing that each
node would have one public key for all the destination nodes belonging to different
networks. This public key consists of two shares (1) node share and (2) network
share. The purpose of the network share is just to confirm that the node belongs to
the mentioned network. The destination node needs to generate the public key of
a source node by getting those shares from the source node and from the Network
Security Manager of the source node as
PublicKey = f{Node Share, Network Share} (5.1)
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For example, a Sensor Node (SN1) of one network wants to establish a communica-
tion link with a sensor node (SN2) of other network. During the registration phase
of a SN with its Network Security Manager, it sends the node share of its public
key to its Network Security Manager. The Network Security Manager generates the
network share of the registering SN public key and also sends the network share
along with a random number to the SN. When a SN1 wants to communicate with
the SN2, it asks its Network Security Manager to get the random number and net-
work share of SN2 from the SN2 Network Security Manager which is assigned by
the SN2 Network Security Manager to the SN2 during the registration phase. The
SN1 Network Security Manager gets that random number and network share from
SN2 Network Security Manager using its secure link, already established, and also
sends the random number of the SN1 and the network share of the SN1 public key.
The SN1 creates a private key for the SN2 after getting that random number and
sends its own generated public key share to the SN2 in the joining request signed
by its private key. When the SN2 receive this message, it contacts it local Network
Security Manager for the network share of the public key and a random number of
the SN1. The SN2 Network Security Manager forwards the network share of SN1
public key and its random number to the SN2 which it receives during the random
number exchange. Once the SN2 receives the network share, it generates the public
key of the SN1 and authenticates the message signature. The node share and the
network share are generated as follow
NodeShare = S = IPNetwork . c . GSN mod PSN (5.2)
NetworkShare = T = S . GN mod PN (5.3)
PublicKey = Node Share ⊕ Network Share mod P (5.4)
Where (PSN , GSN) and (PN , GN) are the pair of prime number and group generator
of the network entity and the Network Security Manager respectively, c is the point
on elliptic curve and ’P’ is the prime field generator.
After successful authentication, SN2 accept the join request of the SN1 and
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generate a private key for that SN1 using the same procedure and sends its own
share of public key to the SN1 signed by its private key. The SN1 generates the
public key of the SN2 by getting the network share from the SN2 Network Security
Manager through its own Network Security Manager and verifies the signature. In
this way, both SN1 and SN2 authenticates each other.
5.2.3 Private Key Generation
Since every node generates and uses a separate private key for authentication and
secure communication with the nodes of other networks for its public key, here, we
describe the procedure of generating a private key. Since all nodes of every network
are registered with their Network Security Manager , the Network Security Manager
assigns a unique random number to each registered member. That number is used
to generate a private key by other nodes to communicate with that particular node
of that network. After the generation of public key by the destination node, it
performs the XOR of the public key with the provided random number. The source
node also gets that number from the Network Security Manager of the destination
node through its own Network Security Manager. The source node uses that number
to generate the private for the destination node.
Private Key = (Public Key ⊕ Random Number)−1 mod PSN (5.5)
5.2.4 Handover
Since SNs are mobile, they may leave one network and enter into another one. To
avoid node replication and Sybil attacks, it is necessary to update the node’s pub-
lic key and private key. To do so, the public key and the private key should be a
function of some network parameters and also do not introduce a large communi-
cation overhead in case of fast mobility. In addition, the public key of the mobile
node should be updated in such a way that there is no interruption in the ongoing
communication. Finally, the private key should be updated accordingly.
Here we describe the proposed approach for updating the keys by considering a
simple scenario that can implement the suggested idea easily without introducing
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communication overhead. Assume that a sensor node SN1 belongs to its parent
network X and after some time it moves to network Y. It sends its node share to
the Network Security Manager of the network Y. Its public key in network X is
PublicKeyX = S + TX mod P (5.6)
When SN1 moves to network Y, then its public key will be
PublicKeyY = S + TY mod P (5.7)
According to the suggested approach, to avoid any interruption in the ongoing com-
munication,
PublicKeyX = PublicKeyY ⇒ S + TX = S + TY mod P (5.8)
Since the Network Security Manager Y receives the node share of the joining node
SN1, it generates the network share TY and sends back to the joining node.
TY = S . GY mod PY (5.9)
Since, TY is different from TX because of different network generators, the node will
generate a number ’d’ such that it makes the TY equals to TX as
d . TX = TY mod PSN ⇒ d = TY . T−1X mod PSN (5.10)
The generated ’d’ is sent to the destination node encrypted with its previous private
key: in this way, the destination node can update the public key of the source node.
After that, the source node also updates its private key.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed scheme in terms of total time consumed during
the exchange of key establishment packets, we used the cooja simulator [74]. The
simulation environment consists of two sub networks as shown in fig.1 and we vary
86
5 – Key Generation for IP-Based Wireless Sensor Networks (6LoWPAN)
the total number of nodes in each sub network. Initially, each sub network consists
of 4 nodes and then we increased them to 8, 12 and 20. More specifically, we consider
four sensor nodes in one network aiming to establish a secure key with the four nodes
of the other sensor network by varying the total number of nodes in each network.
The results shown in fig. 5.2 describe the total time consumed during the first key
establishment process with the node of other network.
Here, we describe some well known attacks that could be possible in the IP based
wireless sensor networks and show that how the proposed scheme deals with those
attacks.
Figure 5.2. Time taken by a node during the exchange of key establish-
ment messages in ms
5.3.1 Connectivity
Connectivity is the fundamental aspect and plays an important role in the net-
work performance. However, it suffers due to the security protocols implementa-
tion in terms of partial key distribution and management, especially in a resource
constrained wireless sensor networks where the connectivity depends on the key
matching probability and hence there is always a trade off between the memory,
connectivity and computational cost. Since, the proposed scheme is based on the
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ECC in which each node has public/Private key pair for secure communication and
also in the proposed scheme, if a node wants to establish a communication link with
other nodes of the network, it just generates the public key of those nodes their
public key shares from the Network Security Managers and there is no need for
anything to be common among the nodes. So, the connectivity of the network in
the proposed scheme is always 100% compared to the key pre-distribution schemes
in which the connectivity is based on the common shared keys.
5.3.2 Sniffing
During the exchange of the pubic key materials (i.e. the node share and the network
share), an adversary might capture those packets to get those shares. But, obtaining
those shares does not allow the adversary to construct the node’s public key because
the construction of public key also requires the destination node random number
assigned by its Network Security Manager during the registration phase. Thus an
adversary cannot get that random number until the destination node gets compro-
mised by the adversary. Since the nodes are mobile, their public key and the private
key is also updated when they change the network (because of the network share of
the public key). Hence the packets sniffing do not help the adversary to construct
the node public key and exhaust its resources by sending some fake packets.
5.3.3 Stolen ID Attack
An adversary might steal the IDs of the authentic member of the network and
capture the node share of the public key of that node and can pretend itself as
an authentic node. In the proposed scheme, if the destination node receives the
link establishment requests (containing the node share of the public key) from an
adversary whose ID is the authentic node ID, the destination node generates the
public key of the received authentic node ID by getting its random number from
Network Security Manager but that key would not be able to verify the message
signature because authentic node private key would not be compatible with the
private key of the adversary node. In order to establish the link with the destination
node, an adversary is also required to steal the private key of that authentic node
as well. Also the adversary node would not be able to generate the public key of
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the victim node because it cannot get the required random number of the victim
node and the network share from the Network Security Manager which is used in
the public key generation. And hence will be detected quickly in the network.
5.3.4 Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service (DoS) attack is the one in which an adversary tries to isolate a node
from a network and keeps it busy to exhaust its resources by sending some useless
data. In the proposed solution, this is only possible if the adversary, somehow, gets
an access to the network and become its authentic member or by stealing the nodes
IDs and their shares of public key. The adversary would use those IDs and shares
in establishing a link with the destination node of the other network. But this
would not work because the adversary would need to sign that message again after
updating its time stamp and by doing so, the destination node would not be able
to verify that message with the generated public key. This helps the destination
node to identify any malicious activity and inform its Network Security Manager
which will inform the Network Security Manager of source node about those fake
messages.
5.3.5 Node Replication Attack
Sensor nodes are very vulnerable and can be easily captured, analyze and replicate
by the adversary in various positions in the network. Such attacks may allow the
adversary to corrupt data and may disconnect significant parts of the network.
Since all the nodes in the sensor networks are mobile and their positions changes
frequently depending on their speed and the size of network, their position should
be updated by their Network Security Managers immediately in case of leaving or
joining the network. Thus the adversary cannot replicate the nodes of one network
into another network.
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Key Generation for Content
Centric Networks
Content centric networking concept was developed at PARC by Van Jacobson and
his team [3], Content Centric Networking (CCN) is also known as Information Cen-
tric Networking or Named Data Networking [4]. Building on the observation that
today’s communications are more oriented towards content retrieval (web, P2P, etc.)
than point-to-point communications (VoIP, IM, etc.), CCN proposes a radical re-
vision of the Internet architecture switching from named hosts (TCP/IP protocols)
to named data to best match its current usage. In a nutshell, content is address-
able, routable, self-sufficient and authenticated, while locations no longer matter.
Data is seen and identified directly by a routable name instead of a location (the
address of the server) and is directly requested at the network level, not its provider.
To improve content diffusion, CCN relies on close data storage because storage is
proven cheaper than bandwidth: every content - particularly popular one - can be
replicated and stored on any CCN node, even untrustworthy. People looking for
particular content can securely retrieve it in a P2P-way from the best locations
available.
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6.1 Architecture of Key Management
The existing key management schemes for TCP/IP networks secure the links from
source nodes to the destination nodes irrespective of the number and type of pack-
ets/data. Hence these schemes are ill suited for the CCNs architecture, where there
is no concept of link between the requesting node and content generating node.
6.1.1 Design Principles
In the standard PKI approach, there is a certification authority and when the desti-
nation node receives the public key of the source node, it validates the received key
using the certification authority. But this scheme is not suitable for content centric
networks, where the keys are related directly to the contents, instead of the source
ID or location. Also in the standard PKI approach, a node can use its encryption
key (private key) to encrypt all the content and the destination node needs to verify
the decryption key (public key) with the certification authority to check the authen-
ticity and integrity of all the received contents. But in content centric networks,
there is no concept of content source ID/location information, hence each received
content key should be verified with the certification authority, which increases the
overhead on the network and the time required to verify the key. Hence in this
paper we propose to use the ideas of using: (1) distributed key holding nodes to
reduce the communication overhead on a single node and (2) key shares to check the
authenticity and integrity of the decryption key as well as of the received content.
In fact, since cryptography is considered as the main building block of any secu-
rity primitive, the cryptographic keys should also be secured and authentic. To this
aim, the key management scheme should be secure and each node of the network
should be able to authenticate the cryptographic key(s). This is the most challeng-
ing problem in CCNs, where the keys are linked with the content names instead
of the content generation source. Hence we have tried to solve the problem in our
proposed key management scheme for the CCN networks which is not possible by
the existing key management schemes for the traditional TCP/IP networks.
Thus, we propose an authentication and key establishment scheme for CCNs in
which the contents are authenticated by the content generating node, using pre-
distributed shares of encryption keys. The content requesting node can get those
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shares from any node in the network, even from untrustworthy ones, in accordance
with a key concept of CCNs. In our work we also provide means to protect the
distributed shares from modification by these malicious/intruder nodes. Next, we
describe the assumptions that we make on the architecture of Content Centric Net-
working, and then describe in detail the proposed key management scheme.
6.1.2 Network Architecture
Since the internet is a composition of a large number of small networks as shown in
figure 6.1, we assume that each individual network has its own network manager,
which are powerful secure nodes which act like servers for management and security-
related aspects of networking.
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Figure 6.1. Virtual internet architecture
Each small network consists in a large number of nodes. We divide all the nodes
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of each small network into two different categories, i.e. (1) Normal Nodes (NN)
and (2) Key Holding Nodes (KHN). Both types of nodes are similar in terms of
capabilities and architecture. The KHNs are responsible for initially holding the key
materials of the encryption key(s) related to the content(s) once they are generated
by any node (source) of the network after the network deployment.
The selection of KHNs is based on the maximum number of connections estab-
lished by a node with its neighboring nodes. This approach minimizes the initial
network traffic due to key management, since each node will be at a maximum of
two hops from a KHN. Note that when nodes are deployed they are all assigned
the same security-related material and hence can play both roles. The distinction
between KHN and NN is made after deployment, when the node joins a network,
and only affects the role that the node plays in providing and using the key material.
In order to select KHNs, each node shares its connections count with its neighbor-
ing nodes. Once all the neighboring nodes receive those count, each node become
aware of its neighboring node’s and consider the neighboring node with the highest
or equal connections as its nearer KHN. Figure 6.2 shows the virtual organization
of KHN and NN in the network.
It should be clear from the figure that nodes 3, 4, 8 have the highest number
of connections with their neighboring nodes, so they act as actual KHNs. On the
other hand, nodes 2, 5, 7, 9 are not selected as KHNs, but can still act in this role
for NNs that are two or more hops away from the actual KHNs, and so on. The red
communication links show paths from the actual KHNs to the second level and third
level KHNs which basically act as KHNs for the end nodes that are not connected
directly to the actual KHNs ash shown with purple color.
Each node (both KHN and NN, since also the former can generate contents)
is also assigned some key materials to generate their public/private key pair for
securing the generated content. The assignment of those key materials to the nodes
is performed off-line while the assignment of key materials related to the content(s)
to the KHNs is performed on-line. The network manager also plays an important
role in generating the key materials for its network nodes.
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Figure 6.2. Virtual organization of Key Holding Nodes and Normal
Node in the network
6.1.3 Key materials assignment
Each node in the network is assigned some important key materials which are used
in generating the public/private key pair in order to secure the generated contents.
More specifically,
 Each node in the network is assigned a random number generator, a one way
Hash function (H), a share generation function (f) and a natural number group
generator G (G can be, for example, a prime number).
 Each network manager is also assigned a fixed random number (NMRN) as-
signed by the network owner, a random number generator, a one way Hash
function (H), a share generation function (f) and a group generator G.
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6.1.4 Key Establishment and Management
Once the network is deployed, each node in the network sends a join message to its
network manager. After the reception of those join messages, the network manager
sends a fix random number (NDRN) and a NeTwork Public Share (NTPS) to each
joining node. The network public share is generated as
NTPS = f(NMRN,node ID,RN) (6.1)
Where RN is a random number from the generator. When a node receives the
random number and NTPS from its network manager, it generate a NoDe Public
Share (NDPS) of its public key as
NDPS = f(NDRN,RN,NTPS) (6.2)
In CCNs, since contents are requested by their names instead of their generating
source, there must be a relationship between the content and its encryption/validation
key. Hence we introduce two further shares generated by the source node of the con-
tent in order to relate the encryption/validation key with the content. Those two
shares are P1 and P2 which act as the two parts of the public key for a content.
These two shares (P1,P2) are generated as
P1 = f(NTPS + Content) (6.3)
P2 = f(NDPS + P1) (6.4)
The required public key kplc is
kplc = P1 + P2 (6.5)
Since each node is given a group with a generator G, it selects a random number g
from G and also creates the hash of the content-related public key shares and the
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corresponding private key kprt as
X = H(P1), Y = H(P2), Z = H(kplc) (6.6)
kprt = K
−1
plc mod G (6.7)
The node also calculates A,B and C for the authentication of the generated content
and its shares as
A = gX , B = gY , C = gZ (6.8)
After the generation of the public key shares and their hashes, the node distributes
those shares among the nodes (KHNs) responsible for holding those shares i.e.
(P1, P2, C, Z,NDPS). The KHNs get the NTPS of the received NSPS from the
network manager. The node includes A and B in the data packet along with the
hash of content in order to help the destination node get and verify the public key
shares i.e. (Content, A,B, Z).
If now a node receives a data packet containing the content and hashes for the
authentication, it needs the public key shares to verify those received hashes. In
order to get the public key share from the KHNs, it sends a key share request to
the KHN nodes. The KHN sends (NDPS,NTPS,C) to the requesting node. After
receiving this message, the node generates P1 and P2 using (3) and (4) and the share
generation function f . After the generation of P1 and P2, the node generates X and
Y using (6). Now the node calculates (CX , CY ) using the received C and calculated
X and Y and then compares them with the (AZ , BZ) received in the data packet.
Successful verification authenticates the received messages and the contained public
key shares.
6.2 Performance Analysis
In this section, we describe the performance of our proposed scheme for content
centric networks in terms of time taken by a node to retrieve a key. We compare
it with the standard PKI approach for key establishment and management. To
this aim, we use the ccnSim simulator [66] developed specifically for content centric
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networks.
In the standard PKI approach, there is a certification authority and when the
destination node receives the public key of the source node, it validates the received
key using the certification authority. But this scheme is not suitable for content
centric networks, where the keys are related directly with the contents, instead of
the source ID or location. Also the in standard PKI approach, a node can use its
encryption key (private key) to encrypt all the content and the destination node
needs to verify the decryption key (public key) with the certification authority to
check the authenticity and integrity of all the received contents. But in content
centric networks, there is no concept of content source ID/location information,
hence each received content key should be verified with the certification authority,
which increases the overhead on the network and the time required to verify the
key. Hence in this paper we propose to use the ideas of using: (1) distributed key
holding nodes to reduce the communication overhead on a single node and (2) key
shares to check the authenticity and integrity of the decryption key as well as of the
received content.
6.2.1 Simulation scenarios
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme against the standard
PKI approach, we use different network topologies provided in the ccnSim simulator
and note the average time taken by a node to retrieve the key(s) for the received
content(s). To do so, each node in the network generates a content which is composed
of 100 files. Each file is encrypted by a separate key and the corresponding key shares
are distributed among the Key Holding Nodes (KHNs). Also each file is split into five
chunks. When a node start receiving the requested file after sending an interest for
that file, it waits until all the chunks of the requested file arrive. Once the requested
file is completely received, the node (requester) sends a request for the key shares
of the received file. After the reception of those key shares from the nearest KHN
(all others will be discarded, according to the CCN principle), the requester verifies
the authenticity and integrity of the received file. Table 6.1 shows the average time
taken by a node in different network topologies to retrieve a key for the received
content.
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6.2.2 Results
During the simulation, we select one node as a key holding node for the standard
PKI approach and three nodes as key holding nodes for the proposed scheme.
Scheme Geant
topology (s)
Level3
topology (s)
Tiger
topology (s)
dtelecom
topology (s)
PKI 0.009 0.020 0.0003 0.0133
Our 0.004 0.018 0.0002 0.0131
Table 6.1. Average time taken by a nodes to retrieve a key for a content
in different network topologies
Topology PKI Approach Our Approach
Geant 0.92 0.93
Level3 0.88 0.91
Tiger 0.96 0.97
dtelecom 0.93 0.94
Table 6.2. Average Hitrate of each nodes in different network topologies
We compared the Hit rate of the proposed scheme with that of the standard
PKI approach. The Hit rate is the ratio between (1) the number of key interests
received by a node for which the node has keys stored in its memory and (2) the
total number of key interests received by that node.
Hitrate =
Hit
Hit+Miss
(6.9)
Where Hit counts how many times a node has a key for the received key interest
packet and Miss counts how many times a node does not have a key for the received
key interest. The ccnSim simulation results are shown in Table 6.2.
6.3 Security Analysis
Since, cryptography is considered as the main building block of any security primi-
tive, the cryptographic keys should also be secured and authentic. To this aim, the
key management scheme should be secure and each node of the network should be
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able to authenticate the cryptographic key(s). This is the most challenging problem
in CCNs, where the keys are linked with the content names instead of the content
generation source. Hence we have tried to solve the problem in our proposed key
management scheme for the CCN networks which is not possible by the existing key
management schemes for the traditional TCP/IP networks.
Since we kept a relationship between the content and its encryption key using the
NTPS and NDPS, only the authentic nodes of the network are able to encrypt the
content(s) using the authentic key(s). An adversary would not be able to encrypt
the content using the authentic key of the network until and unless it becomes
an authentic member of the network (i.e. it receives the key material described
above before deployment). On the other hand, by using the standard PKI approach
for CCNs, an adversary can generate and encrypt fake content using its generated
private key corresponding to an authentic public key. This is easy because in CCNs
key request is based on the content name instead of the generating source.
Also we eliminated the need for a centralize certification authority for the veri-
fication of the encryption keys by using the key share concept and by securing the
keys with the network and node parameters. So the adversary would not be able to
generate a fake private key simply thanks to the non-existence of a single complete
public key.
In order to validate the secrecy of the proposed key management scheme for
content centric networks, we used the AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Applications) tool [67]. AVISPA is a push-button tool for
the automated validation of Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications.
It provides a modular and expressive formal language for specifying protocols and
their security properties, and integrates different back-ends that implement a variety
of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques (e.g. OFMC, ATSE, etc).
We implemented the proposed key management scheme in AVISPA and checked
its security using some of the attacks provided by AVISPA, namely OFMC (On-the-
Fly Model-Checker) and CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher). The
former builds the infinite tree defined by the protocol analysis problem in a demand-
driven way, i.e. on-the-fly and uses a number of symbolic techniques to represent
the state-space. The latter provides a translation from any security protocol specifi-
cation written as transition relation into a set of constraints which can be effectively
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Figure 6.3. AVISPA tool screenshot
used to find attacks on protocols. Both translation and checking are fully automatic
Technique Summary
OFMC SAFE
CL-AtSe SAFE
Table 6.3. AVISPA Simulation Results
and internally performed by CL-AtSe, i.e. no external tool is used. In this approach,
each protocol step is modelled by constraints on the adversary knowledge. These
results are shown in table 6.3.
Also figure 6.3 shows the interface of the AVISPA tool, illustrating a case in
which the intruder acts as a man-in-the-middle. The intruder in this case acquires
the key share but does not have the functions for generating the complete public key
and the key shares ensuring authenticity, hence it cannot modify the actual content,
whose integrity and authenticity are still ensured.
The proposed scheme hence follows the basic concept of content centric net-
works, which states that a node can get the required authentic keys and contents
from any node of the network, even an intruder/attacker. This means that the key
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management scheme must be so secure that the intermediate nodes/attackers can-
not modify the contents/keys which are provided by our proposed scheme. Even if
a node gets the required shares from the intruder who acts as a man-in-the-middle,
a node is able to verify and authenticate those shares.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this section, I conclude my thesis by giving a brief overview over my work. First I
worked on key management issues in ad hoc wireless sensor networks and IP-Based
wireless sensor networks. Later I worked on key management issues in content
centric networking.
The network model that I considered during my research work is based on the
heterogeneous sensor networks model and on the cluster based approach. The net-
work consists of at least two different types of nodes in terms of computational
power, storage memory and lifetime. The more powerful nodes of the network act
as cluster heads and are fixed while less powerful nodes act as cluster members and
are mobile.
In the key pool approach discussed in chapter 3, the proposed solution is based
on two disjoint key pools from which communication keys and authentication keys
are generated. One key pool is used as an authentication key pool and the other
key pool is used as a secret communication key generation key pool. Each FN and
each MN is given a few keys from the authentication key pool using the unbalanced
key pre-distribution approach. The FN and the MN use a common key from the
authentication key pool to authenticate each other. Each FN is assigned two discrete
key pools from the secret communication key generation key pool. The FN selects
randomly a key from both randomly assigned discrete key pools and generates a
secret key for communication with a MN. This generated secret key is transferred
to the MN using the common authentication key by a FN.
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The results of the proposed solution is compared with the basic scheme described
in [51] in terms of memory cost and network resilience against node capture attacks.
The results show that the two disjoint key pools provide a better level of security
by consuming less memory compared to the basic scheme. It is also shown that the
network connectivity in terms of authentication key sharing probability increases
when a MN is in the radio coverage range of more than one FN. This result strongly
supports node mobility in WSNs. Also the node compromised attack on the MN
was discussed and compared with basic scheme. The results show that the proposed
scheme provides better resilience against the node capture attack in terms of less
probability of compromised communication and the node replication attack.
To further improve network connectivity and reduce memory cost, we proposed
an on-line key generation approach. In the on-line key generation approach, each
node is assigned certain parameters and key materials through which two communi-
cating nodes generate a mutual key for secure communication with each other. To
analyse the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, we used OMNET++ simulator.
Also the proposed network topology was cluster based. In comparison with existing
approaches, the simulation results of the proposed solution provide better network
connectivity, reduces memory overhead, increases network resilience against node
capture attacks and requires minimum communication overhead during the authen-
tication and key establishment phases. Hence it saves battery energy and increases
the network life time. In this paper, only intra network movements of the mobile
nodes were considered.
Since the integration of the IP networks with the sensor networks is an interesting
research area so we tried to investigate a suitable key management scheme that
suits two different types of networks. Hence, an authentication and mutual key
establishment scheme is proposed for IP based wireless sensor network (6LoWPAN).
The key construction is based on the elliptic curve cryptography approach and the
key itself consists of two shares, node share and network share. A node need to
obtain both shares of the communicating node to construct secret key using elliptic
curve key generation approach for secure communication. Also to simulate the
proposed scheme, we used Cooja simulator of the Contiki OS which provides the
integration of sensor networks to the IP networks through gateways. This scheme
has good theoretical results against some well known attacks and also take less time
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to exchange the key establishment packets.
We presented in last chapter of this thesis, a key management scheme for Con-
tent Centric Networking. As this new networking paradigm heavily rely on content
authentication to create a new web of trust, a scalable and secure key management
scheme is mandatory for the further development of CCN. We addressed these two
constraints when designing our distributed key management system: (1) we intro-
duced key holding nodes to reduce the communication overhead used for authenti-
cation and (2) key shares to check the authenticity and integrity of the decryption
key as well as of the received content. Performance simulation on ccnSim showed
that our scheme is at least as good as a central authority while its distributed nature
make it more scalable. Thus, the security analysis performed thanks to avispa tends
to prove that no security leak exists.
Our future work will consist in the implementation of our key management
scheme within the CCNx framework and of the emulation of a CCN network to
check our solution against real CCN communications.
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